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14.147 - 賽局理論專題 (2005春季課程)

14.147 Topics in Game Theory, Spring 2005

 

譯者:屠振文

編輯:陳盈,劉契良

骰盅與骰子。(圖片承蒙美國國家公園管理局授權使用)。  

 

課程重點 本課程有廣泛的閱讀資料。  

 

教學大綱

目標

本課程/工作坊旨在向對經濟學理論感興趣的研究生與低年級生提供一個生動的思維環境。我們會在賽局理論和更廣泛的經濟學理論範圍內討論研究觀點和探究課題。我們通常有一個最小化的結構。參與者決定課題與活動。參與者可以在課程進行的任何一個時期陳述自己的工作成果。理想的情況下,其他參與者將用他們的問題和相反論點來向陳述者提問。這樣的討論對研究生而言,不論是陳述者還是評論者都會學到更多可應用在畢業論文的東西,並且有希望激發參與者開始新的研究。同時,我們也會介紹其他相關領域課題的論文。每年,根據與會者的不同,我們會進一步探究某些主題。這些主題包括2000-2001年, Weibull到訪時講述的進化賽局理論;2001-2002年, Milgrom到訪時講述的信念構成及2002-2003年探討的高階信念和關於行為經濟學的主題。今年我想關注實用於應用中的主題,也會提及相關理論觀點的應用,因此,我會稍微偏離我們的傳統,在課程/工作坊之初教授一些議價理論及其應用,包括經驗式研究。這部分的目標聽眾是研究生,有時這些會面感覺像在上課,之後,我們會轉換到平常鬆散的工作坊模式。我們的潛在參與者早已對兩個主題表現出興趣。第一,在過去幾年中,當Marios Angeletos 與 Ivan Werning致力於研究以高階信念為核心的總體經濟應用時,Jonathan Weinstein和我已廣泛地研究有關高階信念影響的理論課題。在工作坊中,我們會討論高階信念的理論和應用,希望能揭開搜集自這雙方面的部分資訊,從而達到互為互利並引向更深的研究。第二,近來流行一種對「無意識」的研究興趣,並出現了一些以此為題的決策論與賽局理論論文。在Haluk Ergin的幫助下,我們會探究這些早期的「無意識」建模想法與集體討論「無意識」建模,以及將其與經濟學理論合併。徜若研究者正努力進行「無意識」建模,且我們不知道有任何的應用,那麼這可能是找出一些應用方法的好機會。不必多說,對這些主題的關注程度由參與者的興趣決定,十分歡迎建議新的主題。  

 

評分 要獲得學分,學生需要寫一篇論文,其中包含一些課堂討論過的想法,並需要對論文進行陳述。   教學時程 相關閱讀材料  

課程單元 閱讀資料
議價
1 完整資訊條件下的議價 理論,根據Rubinstein、Binmore、Merlo與Wilson的研究成果。
Rubinstein, A. 〈議價模型的完美均衡〉"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model." 《計量經濟學》Econometrica 50, no. 1 (1982): 97-110頁。
Binmore, Ken. 〈議價模型的完美均衡〉"Perfect Equilibria in Bargaining Models." 《議價經濟學》Economics of Bargaining. K. Binmore 與 P. Dasgupta 編輯. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1987, 77-105 頁。 ISBN: 0631142541.
Merlo, A., 與 C. Wilson. 〈完整資訊條件下連續議價的隨機性模型〉"A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information." 《計量經濟學》Econometrica 63, no. 2 (1995): 371-399頁。
2 完整資訊條件下的議價(續) 應用與延伸
Bulow, J.與 K. Rogoff. 〈國家債務的持續再締約模型〉, "A constant recontracting model of sovereign debt." 《政治經濟學期刊》Journal of Political Economy 97, no. 1 (1989): 155-78頁。
Baron, D.與J. Ferejohn.〈立法機構議價〉"Bargaining in legislatures." 《美國政治科學評論》 American Political Science Review 89 (1989): 1181-1206頁。
Merlo, A.〈與隨機環境下的政府議價〉"Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment." 《政治經濟學期刊》Journal of Political Economy 105 (1997年2月): 101-131頁。

Diermeier, D.、H. Eraslan 與 A. Merlo.〈政府構成的結構模型〉"A Structural Model of Government Formation." 《計量經濟學》 Econometrica 71 (2003): 27-70頁。

Perry, M. 與 L. Samuelson.〈公開與秘密談判〉"Open vs. Closed Door Negotiations." 《RAND經濟學期刊》RAND Journal of Economics 25 (1994): 348-359頁。

Cai, H. 〈代表選民議價〉"Bargaining on behalf of a constituency." 《經濟理論期刊》 Journal of Economic Theory 92 (2000): 234-273頁。

Stole, L. 與 J. Zwiebel.〈無合同約束下的公司內部議價〉, "Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts." 《經濟研究評論》 The Review of Economic Studies 63, no. 3 (1996).

Yildiz, M. 〈Walrasian議價〉"Walrasian bargaining." 《賽局與經濟行為》Games and Economic Behavior 45 (2003).


Davila, J. 與 J. Eeckhout.〈競爭議價均衡〉"Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium." PIER研究論文檔案PIER Working Paper Archive04-024, 賓州經濟研究院,賓夕法尼亞大學經濟系, 2004.


Li, D.〈歷史依賴型偏好下議價〉"Bargaining with History-Dependent Preferences." 計量經濟學會Econometric Society 2004年北美夏季會議 516,計量經濟學會.


Tyson, C.〈迭代優勢與連續議價〉"Iterative Dominance and Sequential Bargaining." 經濟學論文Economics Papers 2004-W23, 經濟學社群, Nuffield學院, 牛津大學, 2004.


Hart, O. 與 J.H. Moore.〈現在同意到遲點同意:取消的合約未生效〉"Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In." STICERD – 理論經濟學論文系列STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/472, Suntory與Toyota國際經濟與相關學科中心, 倫敦經濟學院, 2004.


Bernheim, B.、A. Rangel 與 L. Rayo. 〈立法政策制定中定論的威力〉 "The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making." 《計量經濟學》Econometrica (2004). (即將出版)
3 不完整資訊條件下的議價 不完整資訊條件下的議價


根據 Kennan, J. 與 R. Wilson. 〈個人資訊條件下的議價〉"Bargaining with private information." 《經濟學文獻期刊》 Journal of Economic Literature 31, no. 1 (1993): 45-104頁。

單邊不對稱資訊


Admati, A. 與 M. Perry.〈議價中的戰略拖延〉"Strategic delay in bargaining." 《經濟學研究評論》Review of Economic Studies 54, no. 3 (1987): 345-364頁。


Gul, F.、H. Sonnenchein 與 R. Wilson.〈動態壟斷與高斯猜想的基礎〉 "Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture." 《經濟學理論期刊》 Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986): 155-190頁。
4 不完整資訊條件下的議價(續) 雙邊不對稱資訊

Cramton, P.〈不完整資訊條件下的議價:雙邊不對稱資訊條件下的無窮大範圍模型〉"Bargaining with incomplete information: an infinite horizon model with two sided asymmetric information." 《經濟學研究評論》Review of Economic Studies 51 (1984): 579-593頁。

———. 〈雙邊不確定條件下議價的戰略拖延〉"Strategic delay in bargaining with two-sided uncertainty." 《經濟學研究評論》Review of Economic Studies 59 (1992): 205-225頁。

Abreu, D.與F. Gul. 〈議價與名譽〉"Bargaining and Reputation," 《計量經濟學》Econometrica 68, no. 1 (2000): 85-117頁。


Feinberg, Y. 與 A. Skrzypacz.〈議價中關於不確定和拖延的不確定性〉"Uncertainty about uncertainty and delay in bargaining."《計量經濟學》 Econometrica 73, no. 1 (2005): 69-71頁。
5 不完整資訊條件下的議價(續) 應用
Spier, K.〈審前談判的動態變化〉"The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation." 《經濟學研究評論》Review of Economic Studies 59, no. 1 (1992): 93-108頁。

Gul, F.〈無法察覺的投資與攔截問題〉"Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem." 《計量經濟學》Econometrica 69, no. 2 (2001): 343-376頁。

Heifetz, A. 與 E. Segev.〈長期國際衝突中的升級與延遲〉"Escalation and delay in long international conflicts.",臺拉維夫大學經濟學院, 2002.
6 不完整資訊條件下的議價(續) 經驗式與實驗式研究

Cramton, P. 與 J. Tracy.〈勞資議價中的罷工與堅持:理論與資料〉"Strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining: Theory and data." 《美國經濟評論》American Economic Review 82, no. 1 (1992年3月): 100-121頁。


Roth, A.、 J. Murnighan 與 F. Schoumaker.〈議價中的最終期限效應:一些實驗證據〉"The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence." 《美國經濟評論》American Economic Review 78, no. 4 (1988): 806-823頁。
7 不同種類信念條件下的議價 不同種類信念條件下的議價


Yildiz, M.〈沒有普遍優先條件下的議價-立即同意定理〉》"Bargaining without a common prior - An immediate agreement theorem." 《計量經濟學Econometrica 71, no. 3 (2003): 793-811頁。


———. 〈等待勸說〉"Waiting to persuade." 《經濟學季刊》Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, no. 1 (2004): 223-248頁。


Ali, S. Nageeb. 〈帶有主觀偏見的多邊議價:等待解決〉"Multilateral Bargaining with Subjective Biases: Waiting To Settle." 《經濟學理論期刊》Journal of Economic Theory (2005年4月4日). (即將出版)


Watanabe, Yasutora.〈爭論解決中的學習與議價:醫療怠忽職守訴訟的理論與證據〉"Learning and bargaining in dispute resolution: Theory and evidence from medical malpractice litigation.",2005會議論文 440, 動態經濟學協會, 2005.
高階不確定性
8 高階不確定性 理論

Carlsson, Hans 與 Eric van Damme. 〈全球賽局與均衡選擇〉 "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection." 《計量經濟學》Econometrica 61, no. 5 (1993): 989-1018頁。

Frankel, D.、S. Morris 與 A. Pauzner.〈戰略性補充下全球賽局的均衡選擇〉"Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities." 《經濟學理論期刊》 Journal of Economic Theory 108, no. 1 (2003): 1-44頁。

Battigalli, P. 與 M. Siniscalchi.〈合理化和不完整資訊〉"Rationalization and Incomplete Information." 《理論經濟學的進展》Advances in Theoretical Economics 3, no. 1 (2003). (Article 3)

Dekel, E.、D. Fudenberg 與 S. Morris.〈臨時合理性〉"Interim Rationalizability." 哈佛經濟研究學會討論論文 No. 2064, 2003.

———. 2004.〈密集型〉"Dense Types.",系所研究論文, 2005年 8月.

Ely, J. 與 M. Peski.〈信念與臨時合理性的層次〉"Hierarchies of beliefs and interim rationalizability." CMS-EMS 西北大學研究論文 No. 1388, 2004.

Weinstein, J.與 M. Yildiz. 〈任何均衡的有限層級含意〉"Finite-order implications of any equilibrium."  Levine的研究論文存檔 122247000000000065, 加利福尼亞大學洛杉磯分校經濟系, 2004.

Yildiz, M. 〈普遍類型空間的合理性〉"Rationalizability on universal type space.",系所研究論文, 麻省理工學院經濟系, 2004.

Angeletos, G.、C. Hellwig 與 A. Pavan.〈政權交替的全球賽局中資訊動力學與均衡多樣性〉"Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change.",國家經濟研究局研究論文11017, 國家經濟研究局, 2004.
9 高階不確定性(續) 應用

Morris, S. 與 H.S. Shin.〈自發性的貨幣衝擊模型中的獨特均衡〉"Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks." 《美國經濟評論》American Economic Review 88, no. 3 (1998): 587-597頁。

———.〈全球賽局-理論與應用〉"Global Games - Theory and Applications." 《經濟學與計量經濟學的進展》Advances in Economics and Econometrics. M. Dewatripont、 L. Hansen 與 S. Turnovsky 編輯. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 56-114頁。ISBN: 0521524113.
  ———〈反思總體經濟學中的多重均衡〉"Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomics." 《國家經濟研究局宏觀經濟學年鑒》NBER Macroeconomics Annual (2000): 139-161頁。

———. 〈協調的風險與債務的代價〉"Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt." 《歐洲經濟評論》European Economic Review 48 (2004): 133-153頁。

———. 〈流動黑洞〉"Liquidity Black Holes." 《財政評論》 Review of Finance 8, no. 1 (2004): 1-18頁。

Frankel, D.與A. Pauzner. 〈動態背景下的不確定性分析:衝擊的角色〉"Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic Settings: The Role of Shocks." 《經濟學季刊》 Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no. 1 (2000): 285-304頁。

Goldstein, I.與A. Pauzner.〈由於投資組合變化產生的自發性財政危機蔓延〉"Contagion of Self-Fulfilling Financial Crises due to Diversification of Investment Portfolios." 《經濟學理論期刊》Journal of Economic Theory 119, no. 1 (2004): 151-183頁。

Angeletos, G.、 C. Hellwig與A. Pavan.〈協調與政策陷阱(全球協調賽局中的信號)〉"Coordination and Policy Traps (Signaling in a Global Coordination Game)." 國家經濟研究局研究論文NBER Working Papers 9767, 國家經濟研究局 2003.

Angeletos, G. 與 I. Werning.〈危機與代價〉"Crises and Prices." 國家經濟研究局研究論文NBER Working Papers 11015, 國家經濟研究局,2004.

Corsetti, G.、B. Guimaraes與N. Roubini.〈最終手段與道義冒險的國際借貸:國際貨幣基金組織的催化財政模型〉"International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance." 國家經濟研究局研究論文NBER Working Papers 10125, 國家經濟研究局, 2004.

Dasgupta, A.〈協調、學習與拖延〉"Coordination, Learning and Delay." FMG討論論文FMG Discussion Papers dp435, 金融市場財團, 2002.

Neeman, Z.〈機制設計中私人資訊的關聯性〉"The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design." 《經濟理論期刊》Journal of Economic Theory 117, no. 1 (2004): 55-77頁。

Heifetz, A. 與 Z. Neeman.〈機制設計中完全剩餘提取的普遍不可行性〉"On the Generic Infeasibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design."  研究論文, 2003.

Edmond, C.〈資訊與對獨裁政權的限制〉"Information and the Limits to Autocracy." ,研究論文,加利福尼亞大學洛杉磯分校經濟系, 2003.
無意識
10 無意識 無意識

Dekel, E.、Lipman, B. L.與 A. Rustichini.〈排除無意識的標準狀態-空間模型〉"Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness." 《計量經濟學》Econometrica 66, no. 1 (1998): 159-174頁。

———.〈無法預料意外事件建模的近期發展〉"Recent Developments in Modelling Unforseen Contingencies." 《歐洲經濟評論》European Economic Review 42 (1998): 523-542頁。

Li, J.〈無意識〉"Unawareness.",研究論文,賓夕法尼亞大學經濟系, 2004 年8月。


Modica, S. 與 A. Rustichini.〈無意識與分割資訊結構〉"Unawareness and partitional information structures." 《賽局與經濟行為》Games and Economic Behavior 27, no. 2 (1999): 265-298頁。


Feinberg, Y.〈主觀推理-無意識條件下的賽局〉,"Subjective Reasoning - Games with Unawareness." ,史丹佛商學院,研究論文系列no. 1875, 2004 年11月.

Fagin, R. 與 J. Y. Halpern. 〈信念、意識與有限推理〉"Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning." 《人工智慧》Artificial Intelligence 34, no. 1 (1987): 39-76頁。

Halpern, J. Y. 〈無意識的替代語義學〉"Alternative Semantics for Unawareness." 《賽局與經濟行為》Games and Economic Behavior 37, no. 2 (2001): 321-339頁。

Heifetz, A.、Meier, M. 與 B. C. Schipper.〈相互的無意識〉,討論論文52, SFB/TR 15,《經濟系統的管理與效率》"Interactive Unawareness." Discussion Papers 52, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems,曼海姆大學2004.

Modica, S.與A. Rustichini.〈意識與分割資訊結構〉"Awareness and partitional information structures." 《理論與決定》 Theory and Decision 37, no. 1 (1994): 107-124頁。

 

作業   本課程有一項作業。要獲得學分,學生必須撰寫一篇論文,應用在課堂上討論過的想法,並需要對論文進行陳述。這個作業的目的是幫助學生開始發展研究想法,並學習撰寫從建模到獲得實質結果的理論論文的程序。論文陳述時,會有廣泛深入的探究與提問,希望這對改進論文有所幫助。

以下為系統擷取之英文原文

14.147 Topics in Game Theory

Spring 2005

Dice cups and dice.

Dice cups and dice. (Image courtesy of the National Park Service.)

Course Highlights

This course features an extensive readings section.

Course Description

This course/workshop aims to provide an invigorating intellectual environment for graduate students and junior faculty who are interested in economic theory. We will discuss research ideas and explore topics in game theory and more broadly in economic theory.



Syllabus

Objective

This course/workshop aims to provide an invigorating intellectual environment for graduate students and junior faculty who are interested in economic theory. We will discuss research ideas and explore topics in game theory and more broadly in economic theory.

We usually have minimal structure. The topics and the activities are determined by the participants. Participants may present their own work in any stage of progress. Ideally, the other participants will grill the presenter by their questions and counter-arguments. Such discussions are meant to be beneficial for graduate students in their dissertation work, both for the presenter and the critics, and will hopefully inspire participants to new research. We also present others' papers in the topics of interest.

Every year, depending on the people around, certain topics are explored in greater detail than others. These topics were evolutionary game theory in 2000-2001, when Weibull visited us, belief formation in 2001-2002, when Milgrom visited us, and higher-order beliefs and topics in behavioral economics in 2002-2003. This year I intend to focus on the topics that would be useful in application, and also provide applications of the theoretical ideas. Hence, I will slightly deviate from our own tradition, and teach some bargaining theory and its applications, including empirical studies, at the beginning of the course/workshop. The target audience for this part will be graduate students, and at times these particular meetings may feel like a course. We will then switch to our usual unstructured workshop format. Our potential participants have shown interest already in two topics. Firstly, in the last couple years, Jonathan Weinstein and I have been extensively working on theoretical issues on the impact of higher-order beliefs, while Marios Angeletos and Ivan Werning were working on macroeconomic applications in which higher-order beliefs play a central role. In the workshop, we will discuss both theory and application of higher-order beliefs. Hopefully this will uncover partial information gathered in both sides and lead to cross-fertilization and further research. Secondly, there is a recent interest in unawareness, and several decision theory and game theory papers have been written on this topic. With the help of Haluk Ergin, we will explore these early ideas on modeling unawareness and brainstorm on modeling unawareness and incorporating it in economic theories. Given that the researchers are struggling to model unawareness, we are not aware of any application, but that may a good opportunity to find some.

Needless to say, the level of focus on these topics will be determined by the interest by the participants, and suggestions for new topics are most welcome.



Grading

To get a credit, a student needs to write a paper that applies some of the ideas discussed in the class and present it.



Calendar

Course Schedule. SES # Topics
Bargaining
1 Bargaining with Complete Information

Theory, Based on the Works of Rubinstein, Binmore, and Merlo and Wilson
2 Bargaining with Complete Information (cont.)

Applications and Extensions
3 Bargaining with Incomplete Information

One-sided Asymmetric Information
4 Bargaining with Incomplete Information (cont.)

Two-sided Asymmetric Information
5 Bargaining with Incomplete Information (cont.)

Applications
6 Bargaining with Incomplete Information (cont.)

Empirical and Experimental Studies
7 Bargaining with Heterogeneous Beliefs
Higher-order Uncertainty
8 Higher-order Uncertainty

Theory
9 Higher-order Uncertainty (cont.)

Applications
Unawareness
10 Unawareness




Readings

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Course Readings. SES # Topics READINGS
Bargaining
1 Bargaining with Complete Information Theory, Based on the Works of Rubinstein, Binmore, and Merlo and Wilson

Rubinstein, A. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model." Econometrica 50, no. 1 (1982): 97-110.

Amazon logo Binmore, Ken. "Perfect Equilibria in Bargaining Models." In The Economics of Bargaining. Edited by K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 77-105. ISBN: 0631142541.

Merlo, A., and C. Wilson. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information." Econometrica 63, no. 2 (1995): 371-399.
2 Bargaining with Complete Information (cont.) Applications and Extensions

Bulow, J., and K. Rogoff. "A constant recontracting model of sovereign debt." Journal of Political Economy 97, no. 1 (1989): 155-78.

Baron, D., and J. Ferejohn. "Bargaining in legislatures." American Political Science Review 89 (1989): 1181-1206.

Merlo, A. "Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment." Journal of Political Economy 105 (February 1997): 101-131.

Diermeier, D., H. Eraslan, and A. Merlo. "A Structural Model of Government Formation." Econometrica 71 (2003): 27-70.

Perry, M., and L. Samuelson. "Open vs. Closed Door Negotiations." RAND Journal of Economics 25 (1994): 348-359.

Cai, H. "Bargaining on behalf of a constituency." Journal of Economic Theory 92 (2000): 234-273.

Stole, L., and J. Zwiebel. "Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts." The Review of Economic Studies 63, no. 3 (1996).

Yildiz, M. "Walrasian bargaining." Games and Economic Behavior 45 (2003).

Davila, J., and J. Eeckhout. "Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium." PIER Working Paper Archive 04-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 2004.

Li, D. "Bargaining with History-Dependent Preferences." Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 516, Econometric Society.

Tyson, C. "Iterative Dominance and Sequential Bargaining." Economics Papers 2004-W23, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, 2004.

Hart, O., and J.H. Moore. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In." STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/472, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, 2004.

Bernheim, B., A. Rangel, and L. Rayo. "The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making." Econometrica (2004). (forthcoming)
3 Bargaining with Incomplete Information

Bargaining with Incomplete Information

Based on: Kennan, J., and R. Wilson. "Bargaining with private information." Journal of Economic Literature 31, no. 1 (1993): 45-104.

One-sided Asymmetric Information

Admati, A., and M. Perry. "Strategic delay in bargaining." Review of Economic Studies 54, no. 3 (1987): 345-364.

Gul, F., H. Sonnenchein, and R. Wilson. "Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture." Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986): 155-190.

4 Bargaining with Incomplete Information (cont.) Two-sided Asymmetric Information

Cramton, P. "Bargaining with incomplete information: an infinite horizon model with two sided asymmetric information." Review of Economic Studies 51 (1984): 579-593.

———. "Strategic delay in bargaining with two-sided uncertainty." Review of Economic Studies 59 (1992): 205-225.

Abreu, D., and F. Gul. "Bargaining and Reputation," Econometrica 68, no. 1 (2000): 85-117.

Feinberg, Y., and A. Skrzypacz. "Uncertainty about uncertainty and delay in bargaining." Econometrica 73, no. 1 (2005): 69-71.
5 Bargaining with Incomplete Information (cont.) Applications

Spier, K. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation." Review of Economic Studies 59, no. 1 (1992): 93-108.

Gul, F. "Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem." Econometrica 69, no. 2 (2001): 343-376.

Heifetz, A., and E. Segev. "Escalation and delay in long international conflicts." The School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, 2002.
6 Bargaining with Incomplete Information (cont.) Empirical and Experimental Studies

Cramton, P., and J. Tracy. "Strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining: Theory and data." American Economic Review 82, no. 1 (March 1992): 100-121.

Roth, A., J. Murnighan, and F. Schoumaker. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence." American Economic Review 78, no. 4 (1988): 806-823.
7 Bargaining with Heterogeneous Beliefs Bargaining with Heterogeneous Beliefs

Yildiz, M. "Bargaining without a common prior - An immediate agreement theorem." Econometrica 71, no. 3 (2003): 793-811.

———. "Waiting to persuade." Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, no. 1 (2004): 223-248.

Ali, S. Nageeb. "Multilateral Bargaining with Subjective Biases: Waiting To Settle." Journal of Economic Theory (April 4, 2005). (forthcoming)

Watanabe, Yasutora. "Learning and bargaining in dispute resolution: Theory and evidence from medical malpractice litigation." 2005 Meeting Papers 440, Society for Economic Dynamics, 2005.
Higher-order Uncertainty
8 Higher-order Uncertainty Theory

Carlsson, Hans, and Eric van Damme. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection." Econometrica 61, no. 5 (1993): 989-1018.

Frankel, D., S. Morris, and A. Pauzner. "Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities." Journal of Economic Theory 108, no. 1 (2003): 1-44.

Battigalli, P., and M. Siniscalchi. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information." Advances in Theoretical Economics 3, no. 1 (2003). (Article 3)

Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg, and S. Morris. "Interim Rationalizability." Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2064, 2003.

———. 2004. "Dense Types." Faculty working paper, August 2005.

Ely, J., and M. Peski. "Hierarchies of beliefs and interim rationalizability." CMS-EMS Northwestern University Working Paper No. 1388, 2004.

Weinstein, J.,and M. Yildiz. "Finite-order implications of any equilibrium." Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000065, UCLA Department of Economics, 2004.

Yildiz, M. "Rationalizability on universal type space." Faculty working paper, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004.

Angeletos, G., C. Hellwig, and A. Pavan. "Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change." NBER Working Papers 11017, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2004.
9 Higher-order Uncertainty (cont.) Applications

Morris, S., and H.S. Shin. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks." American Economic Review 88, no. 3 (1998): 587-597.

Amazon logo ———. "Global Games - Theory and Applications." In Advances in Economics and Econometrics. Edited by M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 56-114. ISBN: 0521524113.

———. "Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomics." NBER Macroeconomics Annual (2000): 139-161.

———. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt." European Economic Review 48 (2004): 133-153.

———. "Liquidity Black Holes." Review of Finance 8, no. 1 (2004): 1-18.

Frankel, D., and A. Pauzner. "Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic Settings: The Role of Shocks." Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no. 1 (2000): 285-304.

Goldstein, I., and A. Pauzner. "Contagion of Self-Fulfilling Financial Crises due to Diversification of Investment Portfolios." Journal of Economic Theory 119, no. 1 (2004): 151-183.

Angeletos, G., C. Hellwig, and A. Pavan. "Coordination and Policy Traps (Signaling in a Global Coordination Game)." NBER Working Papers 9767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2003.

Angeletos, G., and I. Werning. "Crises and Prices." NBER Working Papers 11015, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2004.

Corsetti, G., B. Guimaraes, and N. Roubini. "International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance." NBER Working Papers 10125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2004.

Dasgupta, A. "Coordination, Learning and Delay." FMG Discussion Papers dp435, Financial Markets Group, 2002.

Neeman, Z. "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design." Journal of Economic Theory 117, no. 1 (2004): 55-77.

Heifetz, A., and Z. Neeman. "On the Generic Infeasibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design." Working paper, 2003.

Edmond, C.. "Information and the Limits to Autocracy." Working paper, Department of Economics, UCLA, 2003.
Unawareness
10 Unawareness Unawareness

Dekel, E., Lipman, B. L., and A. Rustichini. "Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness." Econometrica 66, no. 1 (1998): 159-174.

———. "Recent Developments in Modelling Unforseen Contingencies." European Economic Review 42 (1998): 523-542.

Li, J. "Unawareness." Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, August 2004.

Modica, S., and A. Rustichini. "Unawareness and partitional information structures." Games and Economic Behavior 27, no. 2 (1999): 265-298.

Feinberg, Y. "Subjective Reasoning - Games with Unawareness." Stanford Graduate Business School, Research Paper Series, Paper no. 1875, November 2004.

Fagin, R., and J. Y. Halpern. "Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning." Artificial Intelligence 34, no. 1 (1987): 39-76.

Halpern, J. Y. "Alternative Semantics for Unawareness." Games and Economic Behavior 37, no. 2 (2001): 321-339.

Heifetz, A., Meier, M., and B. C. Schipper. "Interactive Unawareness." Discussion Papers 52, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, University of Mannheim, 2004.

Modica, S., and A. Rustichini. "Awareness and partitional information structures." Theory and Decision 37, no. 1 (1994): 107-124.




Assignments

There is one assignment for this course. To get credit, a student must write a paper that applies some of the ideas discussed in the class and present it. The objective of this assignment is to help the students to start developing research ideas and learn the process of writing a theory paper from modeling to obtaining interesting results. There will be extensive probing and grilling in the presentation, which will hopefully improve the paper.




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