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課程來源:TED
     

 

愛德華.史諾登談我們如何奪回網路自主權

Edward Snowden: Here's how we take back the Internet

 

Photo of three lions hunting on the Serengeti.

講者:愛德華.史諾登(Edward Snowden)

2014年3月攝於TED2014

 

翻譯:洪曉慧

編輯:朱學恒

簡繁轉換:洪曉慧

後制:洪曉慧

字幕影片後制:謝旻均

 

影片請按此下載

MAC及手持裝置版本請按此下載

閱讀中文字幕純文字版本

 

關於這場演講

愛德華.史諾登藉由遠距通訊機器人登上TED2014講臺,探討關於監控與網路自由的話題。他認為資料隱私權並非黨派問題,而需要從根本上重新思考網路在我們生活中扮演的角色-以及保護它的法律。「你的權利相當重要,」他說,「因為你永遠不知道何時需要它。」演講中還有Chris Anderson與特別來賓提姆.柏納-李的訪談。

 

關於愛德華.史諾登

2013年,愛德華.史諾登洩露數千份美國國家安全局機密文件,引發關於公民網路隱私權的全球討論。

 

為什麼要聽他演講

愛德華.史諾登即將邁入28歲時,他的臉孔突然佔據了美國各大報。2013年夏天,《衛報》刊登一系列與美國國家安全局(NSA)有關的機密文件,首先是一份關於秘密法庭要求Verizon(美國電信公司)提供美國電話記錄的文件,然後是極機密的NSA稜鏡計畫文件,內容是關於獲取Google、蘋果及Facebook用戶資料的任務。

 

不久後,史諾登以資料提供者身分現身,透露他精心策畫這起揭密事件,在擔任NSA外包人員時拷貝機密文件。當時他說:「我明白我會因我的行為受苦,但如果統治這個我熱愛的世界的秘密聯邦法律、不平等豁免及無法抗拒的行政權力能被揭露,哪怕只有一刻,我已心滿意足。」史諾登的行動引發對國家安全與網路隱私關係的全球辯論。他的揭露持續對美國政府的公眾觀點產生影響,並促使媒體展開對NSA的監督。

 

史諾登曾在香港接受記者Glenn Greenwald與紀錄片製作人Laura Poitras關於洩密事件的訪問;他透露自己的身份後展開逃亡之旅,最後落腳莫斯科。史諾登遭美國政府指控間諜罪,目前在俄羅斯接受臨時庇護。

 

愛德華.史諾登的英語網上資料

Guardian profile

The NSA files

 

[TED科技‧娛樂‧設計]

已有中譯字幕的TED影片目錄(繁體)(簡體)。請注意繁簡目錄是不一樣的。

 

愛德華.史諾登談我們如何奪回網路自主權

 

Chris Anderson:公民的權利,網路的未來。讓我們歡迎揭示這一切的人來到TED講臺-愛德華.史諾登。(掌聲)愛德華現在身處俄羅斯某個偏遠地區,正用筆電操控這個機器人,因此他能看見機器人所見的一切。愛德華,歡迎來到TED。說實在的,你能看見什麼?

 

愛德華.史諾登:哈,我能看見每一個人,太酷了。(笑聲)

 

CA:愛德華,請教一些問題。過去幾個月中,人們賦予你許多稱號。你被稱為舉發者、叛國賊、英雄,你會用哪個名詞形容自己?

 

ES:你知道,所有參與這場爭論的人都執著於我是誰、我的性格如何,以及如何形容我。但當我思考這一點,我認為這並非我們應該爭論的問題。我是誰根本無關緊要。如果我是世上最壞的人,你可以恨我,然後繼續生活。真正重要的是這些問題,真正重要的是我們想要怎樣的政府、怎樣的網路、什麼樣的個人與社會關係,這才是我希望討論發展的方向。我們已目睹討論方向日漸明確。如果非要我形容自己,我不會用「英雄」這個字眼,我不會用「愛國者」、「叛國賊」,我會說我是美國人,是一位公民,就像大家一樣。

 

CA:因此現在為那些不瞭解來龍去脈的人稍微說明一下-(掌聲)-去年此時,你以NSA顧問的身分派駐夏威夷。身為系統管理員,你可進入他們的系統。你開始將某些機密文件洩漏給你精心挑選的記者,最後導致六月份的揭秘事件。是什麼驅使你這麼做?

 

ES:你知道,當我派駐夏威夷時,還有之前任職於情報系統那幾年,我看見許多令我不安的事。在情報系統中,我們做了許多有益的事:一些必須執行、有益於大眾的事;但也有一些太超過、不該做的事。那些秘密做出的決定-在公眾一無所知、未獲得公眾同意的情況下,甚至民意代表都不知道這些項目。當這些問題令我掙扎時,我心想,如何才能以最負責的方式進行;使公眾利益最大化的同時,將風險最小化?在我能想到的所有解決方案中,只有尋求國會協助。當時沒有相關法律,也沒有針對私人雇員的法律保護。在情報系統中,像我這樣的外包人員存在與情報一起被埋葬的風險,公眾永遠不會知道。但美國憲法第一修正案保障新聞自由是有原因的。它容許對立媒體存在,以挑戰政府,但同時與政府合作,展開對話,討論如何向公眾傳達重要訊息,在不將國家安全置於風險的情況下。藉由與記者合作,將所有我獲得的資訊歸還美國人民,而非自行其是地做出公布的決定。我們進行過激烈的討論,在政府深度介入的情況下,我認為最後結果對每個人都有益。政府恐嚇、宣揚的那些風險從未具體化,我們不曾目睹任何造成具體傷害的證據。正因如此,我並不後悔所做的決定。

 

CA:因此我將你揭露的一些例子展示給聽眾。如果我們放投影片,愛德華,我不知道你是否能看見這裡展示的投影片。這張投影片顯示的是稜鏡計畫,也許你能為聽眾說明一下所揭示的內容。

 

ES:瞭解稜鏡計畫最佳的方式-因為其中存在些許爭議-就是先談談稜鏡計畫以外的事。美國本土內的爭議多半是關於元數據。他們說這只是元數據,僅此而已。他們提到一項特殊法定權利,名為愛國者法案215條,大致上是允許無搜索票的竊聽行為,大規模監控整個國家的電話記錄等。你與誰談話、何時與他們談話、你前往何處旅遊,這都是所謂的元數據。稜鏡計畫與內容有關。藉由這個計畫,政府能強迫美國公司-它可委任美國公司為NSA做骯髒的工作。即使有些公司確實進行抗爭,即使有些公司-我相信Yahoo是其中之一-在法庭上提出抗議,但全都失敗了,因為它不曾經由公開法庭審理。這一切僅在秘密法庭進行。我們目睹的某些事,某些與稜鏡計畫有關、令我十分擔憂的事,美國政府其中一項論據是,他們說,15名聯邦法官審查過這些計畫,認定為合法。但他們沒告訴你的是,那是秘密法官在秘密法庭、基於對法律的秘密解讀。他們在33年內處理了34,000件授權請求,33年內僅拒絕了11項政府請求。我們不希望由這些人決定美國公司在自由開放的網路社會中應扮演何種角色。

 

CA:好,現場這張投影片顯示不同科技公司、網路公司被認定加入這項計畫的日期,也就是資料開始被蒐集的日期。現在它們否認與NSA合作。NSA如何蒐集這些資料?

 

ES:好,因此NSA製作的投影片顯示這是直接取得。這對一位真正的NSA分析師-像我這種情報分析員,在夏威夷進行追蹤中國網路駭客之類的工作-意味著這些資料直接出於它們的伺服器。這並非意味著有一群公司代表,與NSA坐在煙霧繚繞的房間裡熱絡地進行密室交易,討論他們如何提供這些資料。每個公司都有不同處理方式,有些較為負責,有些不那麼負責。但重點在於,當我們討論這些資料是如何洩漏的,它來自公司自行提供,並非經由網路竊取。但值得注意的一點是:即使這些公司婉拒,即使這些公司要求:嘿,我們不妨藉由正當程序進行,我們不妨-你知道,我們確實有某種法律審查程序,某種移交用戶資料的依據。我們看過《華盛頓郵報》去年的報導,或許不像稜鏡計畫這麼詳細。報導指出,NSA破解了通往Google資料中心的連結,Yahoo亦遭遇相同情況。因此即使這些公司-至少是在希望採取合法流程的情況下被迫與NSA合作,NSA仍不滿足。因此我們需要這些公司盡力而為,保證他們將捍衛用戶利益,並擁護用戶權利。我認為過去一年,我們目睹這些列名於稜鏡計畫投影片的公司在這方面有長足進步,我鼓勵他們繼續努力。

 

CA:他們還應該做些什麼?

 

ES:目前美國網路公司能做的首要之事-不須諮詢律師-就是保障全球用戶權益,在用戶造訪的每個網頁使用SSL(安全通訊端層)加密機制。其重要性在於,今天如果你在亞馬遜網站瀏覽《1984》(喬治.歐威爾的政治諷刺小說),NSA可看見這份瀏覽記錄;俄羅斯情報機構可看見這份瀏覽記錄;中國情報機構可看見這份瀏覽記錄;法國情報機構、德國情報機構、安道爾情報機構全都看的見,因為它並未加密。亞馬遜網站是全球圖書館,但它們不僅沒有預設支援加密保護機制,當你瀏覽書籍時,也無法選擇使用加密機制。這是我們需要改變的事,不僅對亞馬遜來說。我並非刻意針對它,但它是絕佳範例。所有公司都需要發展預設加密瀏覽機制,針對所有尚未採取任何措施、或選擇任何特殊方法自我保護的用戶。這將加強全球民眾應享的隱私和權利。

 

CA:愛德華,請跟我來到講臺這裡,我想展示下一張投影片-(掌聲)-這個項目名叫「無限線人」。那是什麼?

 

ES:因此我得感謝NSA替它取了一個合適的名稱,這是我最喜歡的NSA代號之一。「無限線人」是NSA隱瞞國會的一個項目。之前國會曾詢問NSA,他們是否有任何方法能粗略估計美國被攔截的通訊數量,他們說沒有。他們說,我們不會、也無法追蹤那些資料,我們無法告訴你們全球有多少通訊遭受攔截,因為告訴你們就得侵犯你們隱私。好,我相當欣賞他們的情操。但事實是,當你觀察這張投影片,它不僅顯示他們有這種能力,這種能力早已存在、早已實施。NSA有自己的內部資料格式,能對通訊進行雙向追蹤。如果它顯示這個通訊來自美國本土,他們就能告知國會目前他們掌握了多少這類通訊。「無限線人」告訴我們的是,在美國被攔截的本土情報數量,勝過在俄羅斯被攔截的美國情報數量。我不認為這是情報機構應該著眼的目標。

 

CA:愛德華,《華盛頓郵報》披露了一則消息,同樣來自你提供的資料。標題寫著:「NSA每年違反隱私條例數千次」。請談談這件事。

 

ES:我們也聽過去年的國會證詞。對像我這種替NSA服務過的人,還有看過真實內部資料、知道內容的人來說,看見官員在宣誓下證稱沒有濫用權力、沒有違反NSA條例實在令人震驚,在我們知道這件事即將公諸於世時。但特別令人感興趣的事實是,NSA違反自己的條例、自己的法律一年高達數千次,包括一起與它本身有關的事件-2776起濫權事件之一,影響超過3000人。在另一起事件中,他們「無意間」攔截了華盛頓特區所有電話。令人驚訝的是,這份報告並未引起太大關注,因為事實上問題不僅在於這2776起濫權事件。參議院情報委員會主席Dianne Feinstein不曾見過這份報告,直到《華盛頓郵報》聯繫她、請她發表對這份報告的評論,她才向NSA索取並收到這份資料。但在此之前她不曾見過。美國情報機構的監督機制是怎麼回事?參議院情報委員會主席對這些規則每年被破壞數千次竟一無所知?

 

CA:愛德華,對於這項爭議,有個回應是這麼說的:坦白說,我們為何要在乎這些監控?我是指,如果你沒做錯事,根本沒什麼好擔心的。這個觀點有什麼問題?

 

ES:好,首先是,你放棄了自己的權利。你說,嘿,你知道,我不認為我需要這些權利,因此我決定信任他們。別想那麼多,沒啥大不了的。你知道,這些人會做正確的事。你的權利相當重要,因為你永遠不知道什麼時候需要它。此外,這是我們文化認同的一部分,不僅是美國,對西方社會及全球民主社會亦是如此。人們應該能拿起電話打給他們的家人;人們應該能傳簡訊給他們的愛人;人們應該能上網買書;人們應該能坐火車旅行、買機票,而不需顧慮這些行為將如何被政府機構監督,或許未來甚至不僅是你的政府,他們將如何曲解及揣測你的意圖。我們有隱私權,我們需要基於合理根據的正當理由或具體嫌疑。因為我們瞭解,在秘密、不受監管的情況下,將所有通訊內容託付給任何人、任何政府機構,確實是不可忽視的誘惑。

 

CA:有些人對你的所作所為極為不滿。最近我聽見一則引述迪克.錢尼(美國前副總統)的說法。他說朱利安.亞桑傑所做的只是跳蚤叮咬,愛德華.史諾登則是咬掉狗頭的獅子;他認為你所做的是美國史上最嚴重的叛國行為。你想對持有這種觀點的人說什麼?

 

ES:迪克.錢尼確實不同凡響。(笑聲)(掌聲)。謝謝(笑聲)。我認為這令人驚訝。因為當朱利安.亞桑傑進行非凡之舉時,迪克.錢尼曾說亞桑傑會讓全球政府走向末日,天空會被點燃、海洋會被蒸乾;現在他說這只是跳蚤叮咬。因此我們應質疑這種過度宣揚國家安全遭受破壞的官員,但-我們不妨假設這些人真的相信這一點,我會說他們對國家安全的觀念過於狹隘。像迪克.錢尼這種有權有勢的人並未保障國家安全。公眾利益並非總是與國家利益一致,在不具威脅的地點與非敵之人宣戰不會使我們安全無虞。這個道理適用於伊拉克戰爭,也適用於網路。網路不是敵人,我們的經濟不是敵人。美國企業、中國企業及世上任何公司都是我們社會的一部分,是緊密相連的世界的一部分。這些手足般的聯繫是使我們彼此相連的紐帶,如果我們藉由破壞標準、安全性、行為方式摧毀這些聯繫,而這是世界各國及公民期待我們遵守的規範。

 

CA:但是,你知道,據說你「竊取」了170多萬份資料,目前似乎只有其中數百份分享給記者。未來是否還有更多爆料?

 

ES:絕對會有更多爆料。我認為無庸置疑,某些最重要的報導即將完成及發表。

 

CA:請過來這裡,因為我想問你關於這個項目的事。請過來看一下。我是指,這是我認為對在座許多技術人員來說最震撼的事,以過去幾個月他們聽過的項目來說。這是關於一個名為「Bullrun」的項目。你能解釋一下那是什麼嗎?

 

ES:因此關於Bullrun,同樣地,我們得感謝NSA的坦白。這個項目的名稱來自一個內戰戰場,英國則稱為Edgehill,這是英國一個內戰戰場。我相信他們以這種方式命名的原因在於,他們的目標是我們自己的基礎設施。NSA藉由這個計劃故意誤導企業夥伴。他們告訴企業夥伴這些是安全標準。他們說,嘿,我們需要你的合作,以保護你的系統。但事實上,他們提供這些公司錯誤的建議,使他們降低服務安全性。他們建立的後門,不僅NSA可利用,任何有錢有閒的人,只要研究並發現它,都可藉由它獲取全球通訊。這相當危險,因為只要我們失去某個標準,如果我們失去對某些東西的信賴-例如SSL,它是Bullrun項目的重點攻擊對象-我們將生活在更不安全的世界。我們將無法使用銀行系統,我們將無法使用商務系統,在不須擔心有人為了自己的目的而監控或破壞這些通訊的情況下。

 

CA:同樣的決定也可能使美國暴露於其他來源的網路攻擊?

 

ES:當然。其中一個問題,我們在後911時期目睹的其中一個危險後遺症是,歷年來NSA均身兼兩職。他們負責攻擊行動,即駭客行動;但他們也負責防禦行動。他們的傳統做法一向是防禦優先於攻擊,基於美國的秘密更有價值的原則。如果我們駭入中國企業、竊取他們的秘密,如果我們駭入柏林一間政府辦公室、竊取他們的秘密,對美國人民來說,其中的價值低於確保中國無法竊取我們的秘密。因此藉由削弱我們的通訊安全性,他們不僅將全球置於風險中,基本上也將美國置於風險中。因為智慧財產是我們經濟的基礎,如果我們因削弱安全性而將它置於風險中,我們將長久地為此付出代價。

 

CA:但他們做了一個計算,證明藉此作為美國反恐防禦的一部分是值得的,這確實是值得付出的代價。

 

ES:好,當你觀察這些項目阻止恐怖主義的效果,你將發現那毫無根據。你不需要相信我的片面之詞,因為我們已進行首次公開庭訊。除了祕密審查外,第一個聯邦法庭審查了這些項目,稱這些項目為「歐威爾式」做法,並可能違憲。可聽取相關簡報的國會目前相當關注這些項目,已提出修正案。兩個審閱過所有機密證據的獨立白宮陪審團說,這些項目不曾阻止過任何美國即將面臨的恐怖攻擊。因此我們試圖阻止的真的是恐怖主義嗎?這些項目有任何價值嗎?我說沒有,美國政府三個分支機構也說沒有。

 

CA:我是指,你認為他們有比反恐戰爭更深層的動機嗎?

 

ES:抱歉,我聽不見。請再說一遍?

 

CA:抱歉。你認為他們有比反恐戰爭更深層的動機嗎?

 

ES:是的。重點在於,在情報界,我們一向稱恐怖主義為「行動的掩飾」。恐怖主義能挑起某種情緒反應,使人們合理化地授權給那些他們本來不會同意的項目。Bullrun及Edgehill這類項目,早在1990年代NSA即要求授權。他們要求FBI前往國會說明理由,FBI確實前往國會進行游說。但國會和美國人民不同意,他們說,不值得拿我們的經濟冒險。他們說,相較於其中利益,這對我們的社會傷害更大。但我們看見的是,後911時期,他們藉由秘密手段、以恐怖主義為理由,秘密啟動這些項目,不曾詢問國會及美國人民。我們需要防範這種閉門造車的政府,因為它使我們更不安全,且未提供任何價值。

 

CA:好,請跟我來這裡一下,因為我想問你一個較私人的問題。談談恐懼。大多數人發現你目前在俄羅斯的處境相當危險,顯然你聽說過曾經發生的情形。布萊德利.曼寧-雀兒喜.曼寧(因洩密給維基解密遭判刑35年)目前的遭遇。根據Buzzfeed網站報導,情報界有人想要你的命。你如何應對這些?你如何應對這些恐懼?

 

ES:你知道,政府人士要我的命不令人意外。我每天早上入睡時,一再確認、思考我能為美國人民做什麼。我不想傷害我的政府,我想幫助我的政府。但事實證明,他們意圖完全無視於正當程序,他們意圖未審先判,這是身為社會一份子的我們需要對抗的事,說:「嘿,這是不恰當的。」我們不該威脅異議分子,我們不該給媒體定罪。無論在目睹最後結果之前我能做什麼,我都樂意去做,不計風險。

 

CA:因此我十分希望得知現場聽眾的想法,因為我知道大家對愛德華.史諾登有許多不同的看法。假設你有以下兩種選擇,好嗎?基本上你可將他的所作所為視為危及美國的魯莽行為;或者你可將它視為英勇行為,對美國和世界的長遠利益有所貢獻?這是我給你們的兩個選擇。我很好奇誰會投第一個選項:這是一個魯莽行為。有些人舉手、又有一些人舉手。當事人就在眼前時很難舉手投否定票,但我看見了。

 

ES:我能看見你們。(笑聲)

 

CA:誰贊同第二種選擇:基本上是英勇行為?(掌聲)(歡呼聲)我認為可以這麼說,我認為許多沒舉手的人還在仔細考量。因為在我看來,關於你的爭議,其中的分界並非在於傳統的政治歧異,並非左派或右派之爭,並非關於親政府、自由主義或其他因素,部分原因似乎在於世代問題。你是隨網路成長的一代,這似乎是你遭受觸犯的本能反應,當你看見某些你認為可能危害網路的做法。這麼說是否正確?

 

ES:是的,我認為十分貼切。這並非左派或右派的問題。我們的基本自由-當我說「我們」時,不僅是指美國人,我是指全世界的人。這並非黨派問題,這是所有人都相信的問題,有賴於所有人的保護。對於見過及享有過自由開放網路的人來說,這有賴於我們替下一代維護享有這種自由的權益。如果我們不做出改變,如果我們不挺身而出,做出保護網路安全所需的改變-不僅為了我們,也為了每一個人-我們將失去這份自由。這是相當大的損失,不僅對我們來說,對全世界亦是如此。

 

CA:好,最近我從全球資訊網創始人口中聽過類似的言論,我想他應該在現場-提姆.柏納-李爵士。提姆,你願意上台說點話嗎?有麥克風可以給提姆嗎?(掌聲)提姆,很高興見到你,請到這裡來。順便問一下,你支持哪個陣營?叛國者或英雄?我心裡有數,但-

 

提姆.柏納-李:對於這個問題我曾提出更長的回答,但答案是英雄,如果我必須在兩者之間作選擇。

 

CA:愛德華,我想你讀過提姆爵士提出關於「制定奪回網路大憲章」的建議。這是否是有意義的做法?

 

ES:當然,我是指,我這一代,我成長過程中,不僅思考網路的意義,也在網路中成長,雖然我不曾料到有機會以如此直接而實際的方式捍衛它,並用這種非比尋常、可說是化身的方式體現它。我認為這頗富詩意:某個網路之子,事實上因政治表達的緣故而更接近網路。我認為網路大憲章正是我們需要的東西。我們不僅需要將我們的價值觀以文字編碼,也得將它體現在網路架構中。這是我希望達成的目標。我邀請所有聽眾,不僅是溫哥華的聽眾,還有全世界聽眾加入及參與。

 

CA:你有問題想問愛德華嗎?

 

TBL:好,兩個問題,一個籠統的問題-

 

CA:愛德華,你還聽得見嗎?

 

ES:是的,我聽得見。

 

CA:喔,他回來了。

 

TBL:你線上的竊聽裝置暫時被干擾了。(笑聲)

 

ES:這是NSA出了點小問題。

 

TBL:因此25年來,退一步思考,在所有關於「我們想要的網路」討論中,你認為我們最多能做到什麼程度?

 

ES:你知道,當我們思考能做到什麼程度時,我認為問題僅在於我們願意投入多少努力。我認為我們過去享有的網路,不僅是一個國家,也是全球大眾所需的網路。藉由合作、藉由參與,不僅是社會中的技術人士,還有你所說的用戶,全球藉由網路、藉由社群媒體而有所貢獻的人。或許只是查詢天氣,或許是時時仰賴網路、將它視為生活一部分的人共同捍衛它。我們將獲得-不僅是現有的網路,而是更好的網路、更好的當下。我們可藉此建立未來,一個不僅比我們希望的更美好、甚至比我們想像中更美好的未來。

 

CA:TED成立於30年前,1984年,此後許多討論的方向一再證明喬治.歐威爾錯了。並非老大哥監視著我們,而是我們藉由網路的力量及透明度監視著老大哥。你揭露的一切彷彿在這種樂觀看法的核心狠狠捅了一刀,但你依然相信存在使情況改觀的辦法;你也一樣。

 

ES:是的,因此有個論點說,老大哥的力量已產生驚人的增長。最近耶魯大學一篇法學文獻建立了所謂的Bankston-Soltani法則,內容是:我們對隱私的期許將遭受侵犯,當政府監控能力的成本降低一個數量級。每當這種情形發生,我們必須重新審視及平衡我們的隱私權。好,自從政府的監控能力提升好幾個數量級後,這種情形尚未發生,這就是為何我們會遭遇目前的問題。但希望依然存在,因為個人的力量也因科技而增長,我是活生生的證明。一個人可與世上最強大的對手及情報機構針鋒相對,並獲得勝利。我認為這是我們希望的來源,我們需要以此為基礎,使它不僅可為技術專家所用,也適用於全球一般公民。新聞工作並非罪行,通訊並非罪行,我們的日常活動不應被監視。

 

CA:我不太清楚如何跟機器人握手,但想像一下它的手在這裡。

 

TBL:這一天很快就會到來。

 

ES:很高興見到你,希望我的笑容看起來就像我眼中的你們一樣燦爛。

 

CA:謝謝你,提姆。(掌聲)我是指,《紐約時報》最近呼籲特赦你。你是否期待這個重返美國的機會?

 

ES:當然。毫無疑問,這個計畫的原則基礎一向是公眾利益,這也是美國及全球新聞機構的原則基礎。我認為,如果媒體現在說,我們支持這麼做,這是必須做的事;這是個有力的主張,但並非最終結論,我認為決定權應交給公眾。但同時,政府暗示他們希望達成某種交易;他們希望我與記者協商,索回我提供的資料。我想清楚地強調,我這麼做並非為了安全,我這麼做是為了做正確的事,我不會僅為了自己的利益,停止為公共利益付出的努力。(掌聲)

 

CA:同時,感謝網路及這項科技。你來到現場,回到北美;不是美國,是加拿大,以這種方式。我很好奇,你感覺如何?

 

ES:加拿大與我想像中不同;這裡溫暖多了。(笑聲)

 

CA:在TED,我們的宗旨是「值得傳播的想法」。如果你能將所有理念濃縮成一個想法,你認為目前值得傳播的想法是什麼?

 

ES:我想說,去年發生的事提醒我們:密室可能讓民主滅亡。但每個人都出生於同樣緊閉的門後,我們不需要為了擁有好政府而放棄隱私,我們不需要為了安全而放棄自由。我認為藉由共同努力,我們可同時擁有開放的政府及隱私生活。我期待在全球大眾齊心協力下目睹這天的到來。十分感謝。

 

CA:謝謝,愛德華。(掌聲)

 

以下為系統擷取之英文原文

About this Talk

Appearing by telepresence robot, Edward Snowden speaks at TED2014 about surveillance and Internet freedom. The right to data privacy, he suggests, is not a partisan issue, but requires a fundamental rethink of the role of the internet in our lives — and the laws that protect it. "Your rights matter,” he says, "because you never know when you're going to need them." Chris Anderson interviews, with special guest Tim Berners-Lee.

About the Speaker

In 2013 Edward Snowden leaked thousands of classified American National Security Agency documents, sparking a global conversation about citizens' rights to privacy on the Internet. Full bio

Transcript

Chris Anderson: The rights of citizens, the future of the Internet. So I would like to welcome to the TED stage the man behind those revelations, Ed Snowden. (Applause) Ed is in a remote location somewhere in Russia controlling this bot from his laptop, so he can see what the bot can see. Ed, welcome to the TED stage. What can you see, as a matter of fact?

Edward Snowden: Ha, I can see everyone. This is amazing. (Laughter)

CA: Ed, some questions for you. You've been called many things in the last few months. You've been called a whistleblower, a traitor, a hero. What words would you describe yourself with?

ES: You know, everybody who is involved with this debate has been struggling over me and my personality and how to describe me. But when I think about it, this isn't the question that we should be struggling with. Who I am really doesn't matter at all. If I'm the worst person in the world, you can hate me and move on. What really matters here are the issues. What really matters here is the kind of government we want, the kind of Internet we want, the kind of relationship between people and societies. And that's what I'm hoping the debate will move towards, and we've seen that increasing over time. If I had to describe myself, I wouldn't use words like "hero." I wouldn't use "patriot," and I wouldn't use "traitor." I'd say I'm an American and I'm a citizen, just like everyone else.

CA: So just to give some context for those who don't know the whole story -- (Applause) — this time a year ago, you were stationed in Hawaii working as a consultant to the NSA. As a sysadmin, you had access to their systems, and you began revealing certain classified documents to some handpicked journalists leading the way to June's revelations. Now, what propelled you to do this? ES: You know, when I was sitting in Hawaii, and the years before, when I was working in the intelligence community, I saw a lot of things that had disturbed me. We do a lot of good things in the intelligence community, things that need to be done, and things that help everyone. But there are also things that go too far. There are things that shouldn't be done, and decisions that were being made in secret without the public's awareness, without the public's consent, and without even our representatives in government having knowledge of these programs. When I really came to struggle with these issues, I thought to myself, how can I do this in the most responsible way, that maximizes the public benefit while minimizing the risks? And out of all the solutions that I could come up with, out of going to Congress, when there were no laws, there were no legal protections for a private employee, a contractor in intelligence like myself, there was a risk that I would be buried along with the information and the public would never find out. But the First Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees us a free press for a reason, and that's to enable an adversarial press, to challenge the government, but also to work together with the government, to have a dialogue and debate about how we can inform the public about matters of vital importance without putting our national security at risk. And by working with journalists, by giving all of my information back to the American people, rather than trusting myself to make the decisions about publication, we've had a robust debate with a deep investment by the government that I think has resulted in a benefit for everyone. And the risks that have been threatened, the risks that have been played up by the government have never materialized. We've never seen any evidence of even a single instance of specific harm, and because of that, I'm comfortable with the decisions that I made.

CA: So let me show the audience a couple of examples of what you revealed. If we could have a slide up, and Ed, I don't know whether you can see, the slides are here. This is a slide of the PRISM program, and maybe you could tell the audience what that was that was revealed.

ES: The best way to understand PRISM, because there's been a little bit of controversy, is to first talk about what PRISM isn't. Much of the debate in the U.S. has been about metadata. They've said it's just metadata, it's just metadata, and they're talking about a specific legal authority called Section 215 of the Patriot Act. That allows sort of a warrantless wiretapping, mass surveillance of the entire country's phone records, things like that -- who you're talking to, when you're talking to them, where you traveled. These are all metadata events. PRISM is about content. It's a program through which the government could compel corporate America, it could deputize corporate America to do its dirty work for the NSA. And even though some of these companies did resist, even though some of them -- I believe Yahoo was one of them — challenged them in court, they all lost, because it was never tried by an open court. They were only tried by a secret court. And something that we've seen, something about the PRISM program that's very concerning to me is, there's been a talking point in the U.S. government where they've said 15 federal judges have reviewed these programs and found them to be lawful, but what they don't tell you is those are secret judges in a secret court based on secret interpretations of law that's considered 34,000 warrant requests over 33 years, and in 33 years only rejected 11 government requests. These aren't the people that we want deciding what the role of corporate America in a free and open Internet should be.

CA: Now, this slide that we're showing here shows the dates in which different technology companies, Internet companies, are alleged to have joined the program, and where data collection began from them. Now, they have denied collaborating with the NSA. How was that data collected by the NSA?

ES: Right. So the NSA's own slides refer to it as direct access. What that means to an actual NSA analyst, someone like me who was working as an intelligence analyst targeting, Chinese cyber-hackers, things like that, in Hawaii, is the provenance of that data is directly from their servers. It doesn't mean that there's a group of company representatives sitting in a smoky room with the NSA palling around and making back-room deals about how they're going to give this stuff away. Now each company handles it different ways. Some are responsible. Some are somewhat less responsible. But the bottom line is, when we talk about how this information is given, it's coming from the companies themselves. It's not stolen from the lines. But there's an important thing to remember here: even though companies pushed back, even though companies demanded, hey, let's do this through a warrant process, let's do this where we actually have some sort of legal review, some sort of basis for handing over these users' data, we saw stories in the Washington Post last year that weren't as well reported as the PRISM story that said the NSA broke in to the data center communications between Google to itself and Yahoo to itself. So even these companies that are cooperating in at least a compelled but hopefully lawful manner with the NSA, the NSA isn't satisfied with that, and because of that, we need our companies to work very hard to guarantee that they're going to represent the interests of the user, and also advocate for the rights of the users. And I think over the last year, we've seen the companies that are named on the PRISM slides take great strides to do that, and I encourage them to continue.

CA: What more should they do?

ES: The biggest thing that an Internet company in America can do today, right now, without consulting with lawyers, to protect the rights of users worldwide, is to enable SSL web encryption on every page you visit. The reason this matters is today, if you go to look at a copy of "1984" on Amazon.com, the NSA can see a record of that, the Russian intelligence service can see a record of that, the Chinese service can see a record of that, the French service, the German service, the services of Andorra. They can all see it because it's unencrypted. The world's library is Amazon.com, but not only do they not support encryption by default, you cannot choose to use encryption when browsing through books. This is something that we need to change, not just for Amazon, I don't mean to single them out, but they're a great example. All companies need to move to an encrypted browsing habit by default for all users who haven't taken any action or picked any special methods on their own. That'll increase the privacy and the rights that people enjoy worldwide.

CA: Ed, come with me to this part of the stage. I want to show you the next slide here. (Applause) This is a program called Boundless Informant. What is that?

ES: So, I've got to give credit to the NSA for using appropriate names on this. This is one of my favorite NSA cryptonyms. Boundless Informant is a program that the NSA hid from Congress. The NSA was previously asked by Congress, was there any ability that they had to even give a rough ballpark estimate of the amount of American communications that were being intercepted. They said no. They said, we don't track those stats, and we can't track those stats. We can't tell you how many communications we're intercepting around the world, because to tell you that would be to invade your privacy. Now, I really appreciate that sentiment from them, but the reality, when you look at this slide is, not only do they have the capability, the capability already exists. It's already in place. The NSA has its own internal data format that tracks both ends of a communication, and if it says, this communication came from America, they can tell Congress how many of those communications they have today, right now. And what Boundless Informant tells us is more communications are being intercepted in America about Americans than there are in Russia about Russians. I'm not sure that's what an intelligence agency should be aiming for.

CA: Ed, there was a story broken in the Washington Post, again from your data. The headline says, "NSA broke privacy rules thousands of times per year." Tell us about that.

ES: We also heard in Congressional testimony last year, it was an amazing thing for someone like me who came from the NSA and who's seen the actual internal documents, knows what's in them, to see officials testifying under oath that there had been no abuses, that there had been no violations of the NSA's rules, when we knew this story was coming. But what's especially interesting about this, about the fact that the NSA has violated their own rules, their own laws thousands of times in a single year, including one event by itself, one event out of those 2,776, that affected more than 3,000 people. In another event, they intercepted all the calls in Washington, D.C., by accident. What's amazing about this, this report, that didn't get that much attention, is the fact that not only were there 2,776 abuses, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Dianne Feinstein, had not seen this report until the Washington Post contacted her asking for comment on the report. And she then requested a copy from the NSA and received it, but had never seen this before that. What does that say about the state of oversight in American intelligence when the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee has no idea that the rules are being broken thousands of times every year?

CA: Ed, one response to this whole debate is this: Why should we care about all this surveillance, honestly? I mean, look, if you've done nothing wrong, you've got nothing to worry about. What's wrong with that point of view? ES: Well, so the first thing is, you're giving up your rights. You're saying hey, you know, I don't think I'm going to need them, so I'm just going to trust that, you know, let's get rid of them, it doesn't really matter, these guys are going to do the right thing. Your rights matter because you never know when you're going to need them. Beyond that, it's a part of our cultural identity, not just in America, but in Western societies and in democratic societies around the world. People should be able to pick up the phone and to call their family, people should be able to send a text message to their loved ones, people should be able to buy a book online, they should be able to travel by train, they should be able to buy an airline ticket without wondering about how these events are going to look to an agent of the government, possibly not even your government years in the future, how they're going to be misinterpreted and what they're going to think your intentions were. We have a right to privacy. We require warrants to be based on probable cause or some kind of individualized suspicion because we recognize that trusting anybody, any government authority, with the entirety of human communications in secret and without oversight is simply too great a temptation to be ignored.

CA: Some people are furious at what you've done. I heard a quote recently from Dick Cheney who said that Julian Assange was a flea bite, Edward Snowden is the lion that bit the head off the dog. He thinks you've committed one of the worst acts of betrayal in American history. What would you say to people who think that?

ES: Dick Cheney's really something else. (Laughter) (Applause) Thank you. (Laughter) I think it's amazing, because at the time Julian Assange was doing some of his greatest work, Dick Cheney was saying he was going to end governments worldwide, the skies were going to ignite and the seas were going to boil off, and now he's saying it's a flea bite. So we should be suspicious about the same sort of overblown claims of damage to national security from these kind of officials. But let's assume that these people really believe this. I would argue that they have kind of a narrow conception of national security. The prerogatives of people like Dick Cheney do not keep the nation safe. The public interest is not always the same as the national interest. Going to war with people who are not our enemy in places that are not a threat doesn't make us safe, and that applies whether it's in Iraq or on the Internet. The Internet is not the enemy. Our economy is not the enemy. American businesses, Chinese businesses, and any other company out there is a part of our society. It's a part of our interconnected world. There are ties of fraternity that bond us together, and if we destroy these bonds by undermining the standards, the security, the manner of behavior, that nations and citizens all around the world expect us to abide by.

CA: But it's alleged that you've stolen 1.7 million documents. It seems only a few hundred of them have been shared with journalists so far. Are there more revelations to come?

ES: There are absolutely more revelations to come. I don't think there's any question that some of the most important reporting to be done is yet to come.

CA: Come here, because I want to ask you about this particular revelation. Come and take a look at this. I mean, this is a story which I think for a lot of the techies in this room is the single most shocking thing that they have heard in the last few months. It's about a program called "Bullrun." Can you explain what that is?

ES: So Bullrun, and this is again where we've got to thank the NSA for their candor, this is a program named after a Civil War battle. The British counterpart is called Edgehill, which is a U.K. civil war battle. And the reason that I believe they're named this way is because they target our own infrastructure. They're programs through which the NSA intentionally misleads corporate partners. They tell corporate partners that these are safe standards. They say hey, we need to work with you to secure your systems, but in reality, they're giving bad advice to these companies that makes them degrade the security of their services. They're building in backdoors that not only the NSA can exploit, but anyone else who has time and money to research and find it can then use to let themselves in to the world's communications. And this is really dangerous, because if we lose a single standard, if we lose the trust of something like SSL, which was specifically targeted by the Bullrun program, we will live a less safe world overall. We won't be able to access our banks and we won't be able to access commerce without worrying about people monitoring those communications or subverting them for their own ends.

CA: And do those same decisions also potentially open America up to cyberattacks from other sources?

ES: Absolutely. One of the problems, one of the dangerous legacies that we've seen in the post-9/11 era, is that the NSA has traditionally worn two hats. They've been in charge of offensive operations, that is hacking, but they've also been in charge of defensive operations, and traditionally they've always prioritized defense over offense based on the principle that American secrets are simply worth more. If we hack a Chinese business and steal their secrets, if we hack a government office in Berlin and steal their secrets, that has less value to the American people than making sure that the Chinese can't get access to our secrets. So by reducing the security of our communications, they're not only putting the world at risk, they're putting America at risk in a fundamental way, because intellectual property is the basis, the foundation of our economy, and if we put that at risk through weak security, we're going to be paying for it for years.

CA: But they've made a calculation that it was worth doing this as part of America's defense against terrorism. Surely that makes it a price worth paying.

ES: Well, when you look at the results of these programs in stopping terrorism, you will see that that's unfounded, and you don't have to take my word for it, because we've had the first open court, the first federal court that's reviewed this, outside the secrecy arrangement, called these programs Orwellian and likely unconstitutional. Congress, who has access to be briefed on these things, and now has the desire to be, has produced bills to reform it, and two independent White House panels who reviewed all of the classified evidence said these programs have never stopped a single terrorist attack that was imminent in the United States. So is it really terrorism that we're stopping? Do these programs have any value at all? I say no, and all three branches of the American government say no as well.

CA: I mean, do you think there's a deeper motivation for them than the war against terrorism?

ES: I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you, say again?

CA: Sorry. Do you think there's a deeper motivation for them other than the war against terrorism?

ES: Yeah. The bottom line is that terrorism has always been what we in the intelligence world would call a cover for action. Terrorism is something that provokes an emotional response that allows people to rationalize authorizing powers and programs that they wouldn't give otherwise. The Bullrun and Edgehill-type programs, the NSA asked for these authorities back in the 1990s. They asked the FBI to go to Congress and make the case. The FBI went to Congress and did make the case. But Congress and the American people said no. They said, it's not worth the risk to our economy. They said it's worth too much damage to our society to justify the gains. But what we saw is, in the post-9/11 era, they used secrecy and they used the justification of terrorism to start these programs in secret without asking Congress, without asking the American people, and it's that kind of government behind closed doors that we need to guard ourselves against, because it makes us less safe, and it offers no value.

CA: Okay, come with me here for a sec, because I've got a more personal question for you. Speaking of terror, most people would find the situation you're in right now in Russia pretty terrifying. You obviously heard what happened, what the treatment that Bradley Manning got, Chelsea Manning as now is, and there was a story in Buzzfeed saying that there are people in the intelligence community who want you dead. How are you coping with this? How are you coping with the fear?

ES: It's no mystery that there are governments out there that want to see me dead. I've made clear again and again and again that I go to sleep every morning thinking about what I can do for the American people. I don't want to harm my government. I want to help my government, but the fact that they are willing to completely ignore due process, they're willing to declare guilt without ever seeing a trial, these are things that we need to work against as a society, and say hey, this is not appropriate. We shouldn't be threatening dissidents. We shouldn't be criminalizing journalism. And whatever part I can do to see that end, I'm happy to do despite the risks.

CA: So I'd actually like to get some feedback from the audience here, because I know there's widely differing reactions to Edward Snowden. Suppose you had the following two choices, right? You could view what he did as fundamentally a reckless act that has endangered America or you could view it as fundamentally a heroic act that will work towards America and the world's long-term good? Those are the two choices I'll give you. I'm curious to see who's willing to vote with the first of those, that this was a reckless act? There are some hands going up. Some hands going up. It's hard to put your hand up when the man is standing right here, but I see them.

ES: I can see you. (Laughter)

CA: And who goes with the second choice, the fundamentally heroic act?

(Applause) (Cheers)

And I think it's true to say that there are a lot of people who didn't show a hand and I think are still thinking this through, because it seems to me that the debate around you doesn't split along traditional political lines. It's not left or right, it's not really about pro-government, libertarian, or not just that. Part of it is almost a generational issue. You're part of a generation that grew up with the Internet, and it seems as if you become offended at almost a visceral level when you see something done that you think will harm the Internet. Is there some truth to that?

ES: It is. I think it's very true. This is not a left or right issue. Our basic freedoms, and when I say our, I don't just mean Americans, I mean people around the world, it's not a partisan issue. These are things that all people believe, and it's up to all of us to protect them, and to people who have seen and enjoyed a free and open Internet, it's up to us to preserve that liberty for the next generation to enjoy, and if we don't change things, if we don't stand up to make the changes we need to do to keep the Internet safe, not just for us but for everyone, we're going to lose that, and that would be a tremendous loss, not just for us, but for the world.

CA: Well, I have heard similar language recently from the founder of the world wide web, who I actually think is with us, Sir Tim Berners-Lee. Tim, actually, would you like to come up and say, do we have a microphone for Tim?

(Applause)

Tim, good to see you. Come up there. Which camp are you in, by the way, traitor, hero? I have a theory on this, but --

Tim Berners-Lee: I've given much longer answers to that question, but hero, if I have to make the choice between the two.

CA: And Ed, I think you've read the proposal that Sir Tim has talked about about a new Magna Carta to take back the Internet. Is that something that makes sense? ES: Absolutely. I mean, my generation, I grew up not just thinking about the Internet, but I grew up in the Internet, and although I never expected to have the chance to defend it in such a direct and practical manner and to embody it in this unusual, almost avatar manner, I think there's something poetic about the fact that one of the sons of the Internet has actually become close to the Internet as a result of their political expression. And I believe that a Magna Carta for the Internet is exactly what we need. We need to encode our values not just in writing but in the structure of the Internet, and it's something that I hope, I invite everyone in the audience, not just here in Vancouver but around the world, to join and participate in.

CA: Do you have a question for Ed?

TBL: Well, two questions, a general question —

CA: Ed, can you still hear us?

ES: Yes, I can hear you. CA: Oh, he's back.

TBL: The wiretap on your line got a little interfered with for a moment. (Laughter)

ES: It's a little bit of an NSA problem.

TBL: So, from the 25 years, stepping back and thinking, what would you think would be the best that we could achieve from all the discussions that we have about the web we want?

ES: When we think about in terms of how far we can go, I think that's a question that's really only limited by what we're willing to put into it. I think the Internet that we've enjoyed in the past has been exactly what we as not just a nation but as a people around the world need, and by cooperating, by engaging not just the technical parts of society, but as you said, the users, the people around the world who contribute through the Internet, through social media, who just check the weather, who rely on it every day as a part of their life, to champion that. We'll get not just the Internet we've had, but a better Internet, a better now, something that we can use to build a future that'll be better not just than what we hoped for but anything that we could have imagined.

CA: It's 30 years ago that TED was founded, 1984. A lot of the conversation since then has been along the lines that actually George Orwell got it wrong. It's not Big Brother watching us. We, through the power of the web, and transparency, are now watching Big Brother. Your revelations kind of drove a stake through the heart of that rather optimistic view, but you still believe there's a way of doing something about that. And you do too.

ES: Right, so there is an argument to be made that the powers of Big Brother have increased enormously. There was a recent legal article at Yale that established something called the Bankston-Soltani Principle, which is that our expectation of privacy is violated when the capabilities of government surveillance have become cheaper by an order of magnitude, and each time that occurs, we need to revisit and rebalance our privacy rights. Now, that hasn't happened since the government's surveillance powers have increased by several orders of magnitude, and that's why we're in the problem that we're in today, but there is still hope, because the power of individuals have also been increased by technology. I am living proof that an individual can go head to head against the most powerful adversaries and the most powerful intelligence agencies around the world and win, and I think that's something that we need to take hope from, and we need to build on to make it accessible not just to technical experts but to ordinary citizens around the world. Journalism is not a crime, communication is not a crime, and we should not be monitored in our everyday activities.

CA: I'm not quite sure how you shake the hand of a bot, but I imagine it's, this is the hand right here. TBL: That'll come very soon. ES: Nice to meet you, and I hope my beam looks as nice as my view of you guys does.

CA: Thank you, Tim.

(Applause)

I mean, The New York Times recently called for an amnesty for you. Would you welcome the chance to come back to America?

ES: Absolutely. There's really no question, the principles that have been the foundation of this project have been the public interest and the principles that underly the journalistic establishment in the United States and around the world, and I think if the press is now saying, we support this, this is something that needed to happen, that's a powerful argument, but it's not the final argument, and I think that's something that public should decide. But at the same time, the government has hinted that they want some kind of deal, that they want me to compromise the journalists with which I've been working, to come back, and I want to make it very clear that I did not do this to be safe. I did this to do what was right, and I'm not going to stop my work in the public interest just to benefit myself. (Applause)

CA: In the meantime, courtesy of the Internet and this technology, you're here, back in North America, not quite the U.S., Canada, in this form. I'm curious, how does that feel?

ES: Canada is different than what I expected. It's a lot warmer. (Laughter)

CA: At TED, the mission is "ideas worth spreading." If you could encapsulate it in a single idea, what is your idea worth spreading right now at this moment? ES: I would say the last year has been a reminder that democracy may die behind closed doors, but we as individuals are born behind those same closed doors, and we don't have to give up our privacy to have good government. We don't have to give up our liberty to have security. And I think by working together we can have both open government and private lives, and I look forward to working with everyone around the world to see that happen.

Thank you very much.

CA: Ed, thank you.

(Applause)


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