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本頁翻譯進度

燈號說明

審定:無
翻譯:張凱婷(簡介並寄信)、劉夏泱(簡介並寄信)
編輯:朱學(簡介並寄信)

下列閱讀資料提供了這門課程的基礎。可由PubMed上(一個提供閱覽生醫課程引用資料的線上資料庫)取得期刊文章摘要。
The readings listed below are the foundation of this course. Where available, journal article abstracts from PubMed (an online database providing access to citations from biomedical literature) are included.



爭論
Debate

是語言塑造思想嗎?還是….?
Well, does language shape thought or what?

認知科學的歷史
History of Cognitive Science

佛洛伊德。〈對於兩種心智功能原則的看法〉(1911年)。於《佛洛伊德讀者》,P. Gay編輯,紐約牛頓出版社出版,1989年,301-306頁。
Freud, S. "Formulations Regarding The Two Principles in Mental Functioning." 1911. In The Freud Reader. Edited by P. Gay. New York: Norton, 1989, pp. 301-306.

加德納。《心智的新科學》,Basic Books出版,1985年,3-7頁。
Gardner, H. The Mind's New Science. Basic Books, 1985, pp. 3-7.

勞倫斯。《暴力線上》,紐約Bamtam Books出版,1966年,183-188和210-211頁。
Lorenz, K. On Agression. New York: Bantam Books, 1966, pp. 183-188, and 210-211.

尼爾森 與 皮爾格。〈眼睛演化耗時的悲觀估計〉(1994年)。在《演化》上再版,M. Ridley編輯,牛津大學出版社出版,1997年,293-301頁。
Nilsson, D-E., and S. Pelger. "A Pessimistic Estimate of The Time Required for An Eye To Evolve." 1994. Reprinted in Evolution. Edited by M. Ridley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 293-301.

柏拉圖。《美諾篇》
Plato. Meno. Excerpt (79e - 86d).

托爾曼。〈老鼠與人的認知地圖〉。《心理學回顧》第55卷第4期(1948年),189-208頁。
Tolman, E. C. "Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men." Psychological Review 55(4) (1948): 189-208.

華生。《行為主義:心理學的現代啟示錄》
Watson, J. B. Behaviorism: The Modern Note in Psychology.

認知科學的大爭議
Big Debates in Cognitive Science

丹奈特,〈從計算邏輯地理的觀點看認知科學〉於《腦力激盪》
Dennett, D. "The Logical Geography of Computational Approaches to the Cognitive Sciences." In Brainstorms.

平克,〈語言的規則〉。《科學》第253卷第5019期(1991.8.2),530-535頁。
Pinker, S. "The Rules of Language." Science 253(5019) (Aug 2, 1991): 530-5.

PubMed摘要︰語言與認知已被解釋為是一種同質性聯想的記憶結構,或者是,一系列基因決定之計算的模組,其中規則操作象徵性的表現。針對英語語法作為一種現象,以及它是如何被處理和習得的密集性研究,得出的建議為上述兩種理論是部份正確的。規則動詞(walk-walked)在一種對於文法處理的神經系統中,透過一套字尾規則而被推斷;不規則動詞(run-ran)則透過一種聯想的記憶而取得。

PubMed abstract: Language and cognition have been explained as the products of a homogeneous associative memory structure or alternatively, of a set of genetically determined computational modules in which rules manipulate symbolic representations. Intensive study of one phenomenon of English grammar and how it is processed and acquired suggest that both theories are partly right. Regular verbs (walk-walked) are computed by a suffixation rule in a neural system for grammatical processing; irregular verbs (run-ran) are retrieved from an associative memory.

魯梅哈特,〈探討英語動詞過去式的學習〉,於《馬克蘭與魯梅哈特》,1986年(選讀)。
Rumelhart, D. E., and J. L. McClelland. "On Learning The Past Tenses of English Verbs." In McClelland & Rumelhart. 1986. (Optional)

認知的架構
Cognitive Architectures

安德森 與 史酷勒,〈記憶中環境的反映〉,《心理科學》第2期,1991年,396-408頁。
Anderson, J. R., and L. J. Schooler. "Reflections of the Environment in Memory." Psychological Science 2 (1991): 396-408.

雀特 與 奧克斯福特,〈認知理性分析的十年〉,於《認知科學趨勢》第3期,57-65頁。
Chater, N., and M. Oaksford. "Ten Years of the Rational Analysis of Cognition." Trends in Cognitive Science 3, 57-65.

PubMed摘要︰理性分析是一種實驗的計畫試圖去說明認知過程的功能和目的。這篇文章回顧過去十年的研究,概述理性分析的方法論,以及此種進路如何關連到認知科學的其他工作。我們透過考慮它是如何被應用道記憶和推論的,來闡明理性分析。從傳統認知科學的觀點,認知系統可能顯示為一種機械作用之相當任意的分類,透過同樣任意的限制。相對地,理性分析的觀點,將認知視為複雜地適應於其環境和它所面對的問題。

PubMed abstract: Rational analysis is an empirical program that attempts to explain the function and purpose of cognitive processes. This article looks back on a decade of research outlining the rational analysis methodology and how the approach relates to other work in cognitive science. We illustrate rational analysis by considering how it has been applied to memory and reasoning. From the perspective of traditional cognitive science, the cognitive system can appear to be a rather arbitrary assortment of mechanisms with equally arbitrary limitations. In contrast, rational analysis views cognition as intricately adapted to its environment and to the problems it faces.

柯林斯 與 屈理藍,〈從語意記憶中提取時間〉,《言語學習與言語行為期刊》第8期(1969年),240-247頁。再印於《計算與智能》,G. F. Luger. Menlo Park編輯,加州AAAI Press出版。191-201頁。
Collins, A. M., and M. R. Quillian. "Retrieval Time from Semantic Memory." Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 8 (1969): 240-247. Reprinted in Computation and Intelligence. Edited by G. F. Luger. Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press, pp. 191-201.

馬克蘭,〈記憶的連結模式〉,於《牛津記憶手冊》,E. Tulving 與F. I. M. Craik編輯,牛津牛津大學出版社,2000年,583-596頁。
McClelland, J. L. "Connectionist Models of Memory." In The Oxford Handbook of Memory. Edited by E. Tulving and F. I. M. Craik. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 583-596.

層次論
Recitation Marr's Levels

Marr, D.。《視覺:人類表徵與訊息處理的電腦式探究》第一章,舊金山Freeman出版。
Marr, D. Chap. 1 in Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Information. San Francisco: Freeman.

東岸vs.西岸
Recitation East Coast vs. West Coast

Fodor, J.,與 Z. Pylyshyn。 〈聯結論與認知架構〉,於《認知》第28期(1988年),3-71頁(選讀)。
Fodor, J., and Z. Pylyshyn. "Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture." Cognition 28 (1988): 3-71. (Optional)

Newell.。《認知的統一的理論》,麻省劍橋 哈佛出版社出版,1990年,17-36頁(選讀)。
Newell. Unified Theories of Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990, pp. 17-36. (Optional) (Symbolic Models)

平克。《心智如何運作》,紐約W. W. Norton & Company出版,1997年,69-77頁(選讀)(符號模式)。
Pinker. How the Mind Works. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1997, pp. 69-77. (Optional) (Symbolic Models)

領域特殊性vs.普遍性
Recitation Domain Specificity vs Domain Generality

Fodor, J.,《心智的模組》。麻省劍橋 MIT出版社出版,1983年,1-38和47-52頁(摘錄)
Fodor, J. The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1983, pp. 1-38, and 47-52. (Excerpt)

———.確認和第四、五章於《心智不是這樣運作》,麻省劍橋 MIT出版社出版,2000年。
———. Acknowledgements and Chaps. 4, and 5 in The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000.

Frensch, P. A.,與 A. Buchner,〈領域普遍性vs.領域特殊性〉,於《認知的本質》,R. J. Sternberg編輯,麻省劍橋 MIT出版社出版,1999年,155-163頁。
Frensch, P. A., and A. Buchner. "Domain-generality Versus Domain Specificity." In The Nature of Cognition. Edited by R. J. Sternberg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999, pp. 155-163.

平克,《語言本能》,紐約William and Morrow Co.出版,1994年,419-430頁。(摘錄)
譯者注:《語言本能 : 探索人類語言進化的奧祕》 / 史迪芬.平克(Steven Pinker)著; 洪蘭譯。臺北市 : 商業周刊出版 : 城邦文化發行, 1998年。
Pinker, S. The Language Instinct. New York: William and Morrow Co., 1994, pp. 419-430. (Excerpt)

心智表徵 I
Mental Representation I

Goldstone, R. L., 與 A. Kersten,〈概念與類別〉,於《實驗心理學專業手冊》。A. F. Healy, and R. W. Proctor.編輯,第4卷,紐約Wiley出版。(期刊內)
Goldstone, R. L., and A. Kersten. "Concepts and Categories." In Comprehensive Handbook of Psychology: Experimental Psychology. Edited by A. F. Healy, and R. W. Proctor. Vol. 4. New York: Wiley. (in press)

馬丁與墨非,〈理論在概念整合中扮演的角色〉,於《概念:核心閱讀》第19章。E. Margulis, and S. Laurence編輯,麻省劍橋 MIT出版社出版,1999年。
Medin, and Murphy. "The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coherence." Chap. 19 in Concepts: Core Readings. Edited by E. Margulis, and S. Laurence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999.

維根斯坦,〈哲學的調查〉,於《概念:核心閱讀》第6章。E. Margulis, and S. Laurence編輯,麻省劍橋 MIT出版社,1999年。(摘錄)
Wittgenstein. "Philosophical Investigations." Chap. 6 in Concepts: Core Readings. Edited by E. Margulis, and S. Laurence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999. (Excerpt)

心智表徵 II
Mental Representation II

巴薩魯,〈知覺符號系統〉,於《行為和大腦科學》第22卷第4期,577-660頁。
Barsalou, Lawrence W. "Perceptual Symbol Systems. " In Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 22, 4, pp. 577-660.

PubMed 摘要︰二十世紀以前,知識論將感知視為先天固有的。此後,邏輯、統計學和人工語言的發展刺激了非典型理論的產生,其所依賴的根本原則不同於那些持基礎性感知的理論。另外,感知的進路已經廣泛地被視為難以支持的了,因為它們被假定為工具性的記錄系統,而非概念系統。一種知識的感知理論,在此當前的認知科學和神經科學的脈絡中被發展。在感知經驗過程中,大腦中的聯合區域捕捉了感知機動區裡活化的從個別到全貌之形態。接著,在一種綜合的模式中,聯合區部份地再恢復感知激動區的活動,以執行感知的符號。
感知符號的儲存和恢復在感知構成要素的層次上運作 – 而非在整體的感知經驗的層次上。透過選擇性注意力的使用,感知構成要素的圖式表現被從經驗中抽離出並被保存在記憶中(例如,綠色、鳴叫聲、熱等個別記憶)。當相同要素的記憶被圍繞著一個共同架構上組織,它們執行了一種模仿器的作用,對該要素產生無限多的模擬(例如,鳴叫聲的模擬)。這樣的模仿器不僅是發揮了感知經驗的某些方面,它們也發揮了本體感覺(例如,抬起、跑)和內省(例如,比較、記憶、高興、飢餓)。當確立後,這些模仿器,執行一個基本的概念系統,表現多種形態、提供範疇區分和產生範疇的推論。這些模仿器還進一步地提供了創造構思、陳述命題和抽象概念,因此執行了一個充分的概念系統。創造構思來自於組合性地和遞迴性遞整合了模仿器,以產生複雜的模仿活動。陳述命題來自於聯結模仿器以察覺個別對象,表現形態-標記關係。抽象概念則是以對組合了外在物理和內在省思之事件的複雜模仿為基礎。所以,一種知識的知覺理論可以說明完備功能的概念系統,而避免結合非典型符號系統所產生的問題。關於認知、神經科學、演化、生長,和人工智慧所涉及的內容都將被探索。

PubMed abstract: Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statistics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement recording systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The storage and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components--not at the level of holistic perceptual experiences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a common frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspection (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinatorially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored.

Lakoff, G., 與 M. Johnson.,〈人類概念系統的隱喻結構〉,《認知科學》第4卷第2期(1980年),195-208頁。
Lakoff, G., and M. Johnson. "The Metaphorical Structure of the Human Conceptual System." Cognitive-Science 4(2) (1980): 195-208.

藍道爾與杜曼,〈柏拉圖問題的解答:知識獲得、歸納及表徵的潛在語意分析理論〉,《心理學回顧》第104期(1997年)。
Landauer, T. K., and S. T. Dumais. "A Solution to Plato's Problem: The Latent Semantic Analysis Theory of the Acquisition, Induction, and Representation of Knowledge." Psychological Review 104 (1997).

波特,〈瞭解句子和景象:概念短期記憶所扮演的角色〉,於《感覺記憶》,V. Coltheart.編輯。麻省劍橋MIT出版社,1999年。
Potter, M. C. "Understanding Sentences and Scenes: The Role of Conceptual Short Term Memory." In Fleeting Memories. Edited by V. Coltheart. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.

對於心象的爭論
DEBATE on Mental Imagery

Kosslyn, S,〈心像〉,於《視覺認知:通往認知科學的邀請》,D. N. Osherson, and S. M. Kosslyn編輯,第二卷,麻省劍橋MIT出版社出版,1995年,267-295頁。
Kosslyn, S. "Mental Imagery." In Visual Cognition: An Invitation to Cognitive Science. Edited by D. N. Osherson, and S. M. Kosslyn. Vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995, pp. 267-295.

Pylyshyn.,《心像:理論的追尋》。BBS。(期刊內)
Pylyshyn. Mental Imagery: In Search of a Theory. BBS. (in press)

類比與相似
Analogy & Similarity

Gentner, D., and A. B. Markman.,〈類比與相似的結構繪圖〉,於《心智閱讀》。麻省劍橋MIT出版社出版,1998年,127-156頁。
Gentner, D., and A. B. Markman. "Structure Mapping in Analogy and Similarity." In Mind Readings. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998, pp. 127-156.

顧德曼,〈相似性的七個難題〉,於《問題與方案》,紐約Bobbs-Merrill出版,1972年,437-447頁。
Goodman, N. "Seven Strictures on Similarity." In Problems and Projects. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972, pp. 437-447.

Medin, D. L., R. Goldstone, 與 D. Gentner.,〈相似性的多元面向〉,《心理學回顧》第100期(1993年),254-278頁。
Medin, D. L., R. Goldstone, and D. Gentner. "Respects for Similarity." Psychological Review 100 (1993): 254-278.

雪帕,〈多元向度量尺、集群分析以及樹狀圖適配〉,於《科學》210期(1980年),390-390頁(選讀)。
Shepard, R. N. "Multidimensional Scaling, Clustering, and Treefitting." Science 210 (1980): 390-398. (Optional)

托夫斯基,〈相似性的特徵〉,《心理學回顧》第84期(1977年),327-352頁。
Tversky, A. "Features of Similarity." Psychological Review 84 (1977): 327-352.

認知發展
Cognitive Development

莫非,《概念的大書》第九、十章。
Murphy. G. Chaps. 9 and 10 in The Big Book of Concepts.

概括與相似性
Generalization & Similarity

米勒,《邏輯系統》。1843年。摘錄(選讀)。
Mill, J. S. A System of Logic. 1843. Excerpt. (Optional)

雪帕,〈多元向度量尺、集群分析以及樹狀圖適配〉於《科學》第210期(1980年),390-390頁。(選讀,僅是為了提醒你對Lera講課的回憶)
Shepard, R. N. "Multidimensional Scaling, Clustering, and Tree-Fitting." Science 210 (1980): 390-398. (Optional--just refresh your memory from Lera's lecture)

———.〈追求一個心理科學的統一整合理論〉,《科學》237期(1987年),1317-1323頁。
———. "Towards a Universal Theory of Generalization for Psychological Science." Science 237 (1987): 1317-1323.

PubMed摘要︰對於任何一組刺激物的心理學空間的建立,是透過確定刺激物之間的刻度距離,如此,對於任何刺激物之反應而習得的可能性,是一種能夠被普遍應用到其他任何對象之間距離上,單一不變的功能。為了能達到近似,這種普遍化的可能性(i)此距離以指數方式衰退,並且(ii)當刺激物變化時,依賴於維度之間的關係,如此而與兩刻度之一保持一致。這些經驗的規律性是數學上地從自然對象和可能性幾何學的普遍原理推演而來,透過演化的內在化,趨向於管治所有感覺機體的行為。

PubMed abstract: A psychological space is established for any set of stimuli by determining metric distances between the stimuli such that the probability that a response learned to any stimulus will generalize to any other is an invariant monotonic function of the distance between them. To a good approximation, this probability of generalization (i) decays exponentially with this distance, and (ii) does so in accordance with one of two metrics, depending on the relation between the dimensions along which the stimuli vary. These empirical regularities are mathematically derivable from universal principles of natural kinds and probabilistic geometry that may, through evolutionary internalization, tend to govern the behaviors of all sentient organisms.

Tenenbaum, J. B., 與 T. L. Griffiths.,〈整合、相似以及貝氏推論〉,《行為與大腦科學》第24卷第4期,2001年。
Tenenbaum, J. B., and T. L. Griffiths. "Generalization, Similarity, and Bayesian Inference." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24(4) (2001).

PubMed摘要︰Shepard論證了一種普遍律將管治跨越不同感知和認知領域的普遍化,而且跨越不同物種,甚至不同星球的機體。從關於某些自然種類的基本假設開始,在普遍化梯度的形式上,他得出了一種指數的衰退功能,明顯地與廣大範圍的經驗數據相符合。然而,他原始的公式只能適用於普遍化的理想例子,從一個單純的刺激物遭遇一個新的刺激物,而刺激物可以被表現為連續刻度之心理學空間的點。在此,我們在一般貝氏統計的框架中重新探討Shepard的理論,顯示這個理論如何自然地延伸他的思考方向,探究普遍化之更為現實的狀況,來自多樣隨之出現的刺激物,帶有任意代表性的結構。我們的架構也容納了Tversky的相似性之集合論模型的觀點,它在慣例上被視為Shepard對於相似性和普遍化之連續刻度空間模型的優先選擇。這種統一使得我們不僅能導出介於集合論與空間途徑之更深刻的平行關係,而且也意義深遠地推進了集合論模型的解釋能力。

PubMed abstract: Shepard has argued that a universal law should govern generalization across different domains of perception and cognition, as well as across organisms from different species or even different planets. Starting with some basic assumptions about natural kinds, he derived an exponential decay function as the form of the universal generalization gradient, which accords strikingly well with a wide range of empirical data. However, his original formulation applied only to the ideal case of generalization from a single encountered stimulus to a single novel stimulus, and for stimuli that can be represented as points in a continuous metric psychological space. Here we recast Shepard's theory in a more general Bayesian framework and show how this naturally extends his approach to the more realistic situation of generalizing from multiple consequential stimuli with arbitrary representational structure. Our framework also subsumes a version of Tversky's set-theoretic model of similarity, which is conventionally thought of as the primary alternative to Shepard's continuous metric space model of similarity and generalization. This unification allows us not only to draw deep parallels between the set-theoretic and spatial approaches, but also to significantly advance the explanatory power of set-theoretic models

托夫斯基,〈相似性的特徵〉,《心理學回顧》84期(1977年),327-352頁。
Tversky, A. "Features of Similarity." Psychological Review 84 (1977): 327-352.

(選讀,僅是為了提醒你對Lera講課的回憶)
(Optional -- just refresh your memory from Lera's lecture)

關聯與分類
Association & Categorization

Gluck, M., 與 G. Bower.,〈從制約到類別學習:一個適應的網路模式〉,《實驗心理學期刊:一般》第8期(1988年)37-50頁。
Gluck, M., and G. Bower. "From Conditioning to Category Learning: An Adaptive Network Model." Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 8 (1988): 37-50.

PubMed摘要︰我們使用了適當的網絡理論,去延伸Rescorla-Wagner (1972)對人類學習和判斷之現象的最小均值平方(LMS)模型。在三個實驗的主題中,學習去分類帶有特定症狀類型,就如某種疾病的假設病患。當疾病更像是另一種時,模型預測,主體將實質上作出罕見疾病之確切症狀的診斷。實驗1和2的結果提供對於此種,在對比從可能性配對、範例取得、或單純原型學習模型之預測上的明顯支持。實驗3對比適當的網絡模型,與預測類型可能性配對模型,當病患總是擁有四種症狀(從四組對立選項中選擇)而非出現或缺少四種症狀中的個別症狀,如在實驗1中的情況。結果再度支持Rescorla-Wagner LMS學習規則符合於一種適當的網絡模型。

PubMed abstract: We used adaptive network theory to extend the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) least mean squares (LMS) model of associative learning to phenomena of human learning and judgment. In three experiments subjects learned to categorize hypothetical patients with particular symptom patterns as having certain diseases. When one disease is far more likely than another, the model predicts that subjects will substantially overestimate the diagnosticity of the more valid symptom for the rare disease. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 provide clear support for this prediction in contradistinction to predictions from probability matching, exemplar retrieval, or simple prototype learning models. Experiment 3 contrasted the adaptive network model with one predicting pattern-probability matching when patients always had four symptoms (chosen from four opponent pairs) rather than the presence or absence of each of four symptoms, as in Experiment 1. The results again support the Rescorla-Wagner LMS learning rule as embedded within an adaptive network model.

休謨,《人性論》。第一部份第4段(10-13頁),第三部分第4段(86-94頁),第三部分第12段(130-143)頁。(選讀)
Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Nature. Part I Section 4 (pp. 10-13), Part III Section VI (pp. 86-94), Part III Section XII (pp. 130-143.) (Optional)

Kruschke, J. K.,〈人類類別學習:指向退後的繁殖模式〉,《連結科學》第五卷第1期(1993年)3-37頁。
Kruschke, J. K. "Human Category Learning: Implications for Back Propagation Models." Connection Science 5 (1) (1993): 3-37.

諾索夫斯基,〈分類的正向偏好與範例模式〉,於《分類的理想表現與模範模式》,M. Oaksford, and N. Chater編輯,紐約牛津大學出版社出版,1998年,219-247頁。
Nosofsky, R. M. "Optimal Performance and Exemplar Models of Classification." In Rational Models of Cognition. Edited by M. Oaksford, and N. Chater. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 219-247.

OR

史密斯與馬丁,〈範例觀點〉,於《分類與概念》,哈佛,1981年。
Smith, E. E., and D. L. Medin. "The Exemplar View." In Categories and Concepts. Harvard. 1981.

Tenenbaum, J. B.,〈規則與相似性應用在概念學習〉,於《神經訊息歷程系統的進展》第12期,2000年。
Tenenbaum, J. B. "Rules and Similarity in Concept Learning." In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 12. 2000.

針對歸納法問題的討論
DISCUSSION on Problems of Induction

顧德曼,〈歸納法的新謎團〉,於《事實,虛構與預報》第三章。麻省劍橋哈佛大學出版社,1955年。
Goodman, N. "The New Riddle of Induction." Chap. 3 in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955.

莫非,〈分類組織與概念的基本層次〉,於《概念的大書》第七章。MIT出版社,2002年。
Murphy, G. L. "Taxonomic Organization and the Basic Level of Concepts." Chap. 7 in The Big Book of Concepts. MIT Press, 2002.

OR

Rosch, E.,〈分類的原則〉於《認知與分類》,E. Rosch, and B. Lloyd. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum編輯,1978年(再印於《概念:核心閱讀》,E. Margulis, and S. Laurence.編輯。麻省劍橋MIT出版社,1999年,189-206頁。)
Rosch, E. "Principles of Categorization." In Cognition and Categorization. Edited by E. Rosch, and B. Lloyd. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1978. (Reprinted in Concepts: Core Readings. Edited by E. Margulis, and S. Laurence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999, pp. 189-206.)

Osherson, D. N., E. E. Smith, O. Wilkie, A. Lopez, 與 E. Shafir.,〈類別為基的歸納〉,《心理學回顧》第97期(1990年)185-200頁。
Osherson, D. N., E. E. Smith, O. Wilkie, A. Lopez, and E. Shafir. "Category-Based Induction." Psychological Review 97 (1990): 185-200.

Sanjana, N., 與 J. B. Tenenbaum.,〈歸納整合的貝氏模式〉於《神經訊息歷程系統的進展》第15期,2002年。
Sanjana, N., and J. B. Tenenbaum. "Bayesian Models of Inductive Generalization." In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 15. 2002.

因果關係
Causality

Glymour, C.,〈原因的學習:因果解釋的心理解釋〉,《心智與機器》第8期(1998年)39-60頁。
Glymour, C. "Learning Causes: Psychological Explanations of Causal Explanation." Minds and Machines 8 (1998): 39-60.

Hewstone, M.,《歸因:從認知歷程到集合的信念》,Blackwell出版。(摘錄)
Hewstone, M. Causal Attribution: From Cognitive Processes to Collective Beliefs. Blackwell. Excerpt.

Scholl, B. J., 與 P. Tremoulet.,〈知覺的因果與生命〉,《認知科學的趨勢》第4卷第8期(2000年)299-309頁。
Scholl, B. J., and P. Tremoulet. "Perceptual Causality and Animacy." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4(8) (2000): 299-309.

PubMed摘要︰由移動的2-D幾何形狀所組成之特定簡單的視覺表現,可以引發對高階性質如因果性和具生命性的認識。此篇文章回顧了近期對於這類現象的研究,開始於Michotte、Heider和Simmel等人的經典性工作。這些現象的重要性,部份源自於如此事實:這些解釋似乎在自然世界中被大量的感知 – 相當快速、自動地、不可壓制和高度刺激驅動的 – 儘管它們包含了典型地聯結於較高層次之認知程序的印象。此一研究主張就如同視覺系統的作用,藉由推斷如3-D形狀的性質,發現世界的物理結構,它也藉由推論如因果性和具生命性,世界的因果和社會結構。

PubMed abstract: Certain simple visual displays consisting of moving 2-D geometric shapes can give rise to percepts with high-level properties such as causality and animacy. This article reviews recent research on such phenomena, which began with the classic work of Michotte and of Heider and Simmel. The importance of such phenomena stems in part from the fact that these interpretations seem to be largely perceptual in nature - to be fairly fast, automatic, irresistible and highly stimulus driven - despite the fact that they involve impressions typically associated with higher-level cognitive processing. This research suggests that just as the visual system works to recover the physical structure of the world by inferring properties such as 3-D shape, so too does it work to recover the causal and social structure of the world by inferring properties such as causality and animacy.

Shanks, D. R. ,〈人是理性學習的嗎?〉,《實驗心理學季刊》48卷A第2期(1995年)257-279頁。
Shanks, D. R. "Is Human Learning Rational?" The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 48A (2) (1995): 257-279.

PubMed摘要︰透過聯想的學習,我們可以預測和控制世界中的事件。這樣的學習是理性的,如果我們願意相信一種聯想關係存在於兩個事件之間,只有當它們真實如此。統計學上的數據P,在預先事件出現後結果事件的可能性,與缺少預先事件之結果事件的可能之間的差異,告訴我們何時以及何種範圍內,事件是確實相關的。相反於總是被宣稱的,人類的聯想判斷非常有利地與數據P比較,甚至是當多重預測的提示彼此為了結果相聯想而競爭的情況中。人類如何達到此一判斷的準確性?我將論證它並非透過數據P規則之明確的心理觀點之應用。反而,準確的判斷是一種聯想心理學論者之學習程序的偶然性質,已經在認知的適當網絡模型中變得常見。這樣的一種聯想心理學論機制,是一種對基準或統計學上之「目的」的「手段」。

PubMed abstract: We can predict and control events in the world via associative learning. Such learning is rational if we come to believe that an associative relationship exists between a pair of events only when it truly does. The statistical metric delta P, the difference between the probability of an outcome event in the presence of the predictor and its probability in the absence of the predictor tells us when and to what extent events are indeed related. Contrary to what is often claimed, humans' associative judgements compare very favourably with the delta P metric, even in situations where multiple predictive cues are in competition for association with the outcome. How do humans achieve this judgmental accuracy? I argue that it is not via the application of an explicit mental version of the delta P rule. Instead, accurate judgements are an emergent property of an associationist learning process of the sort that has become common in adaptive network models of cognition. Such an associationist mechanism is the "means" to a normative or statistical "end".

直覺理論
Intuitive Theories

Carey, S.(1985年)再印於《概念:核心閱讀》,Margolis, and Laurence編輯,MIT出版社。
Carey, S. (1985). Reprinted in Concepts: Core Readings. Edited by Margolis, and Laurence. MIT Press.

Goldman, A., 與 V. Gallese.,〈讀心術對應的神經原與模擬理論〉,《認知科學趨勢》第2卷12期(1998)493-501頁。
Goldman, A., and V. Gallese. "Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading." Trends in Cognitive Science 2 (12) (1998): 493-501.

Gopnik, A., 與 C. Glymour.,〈因果地圖與貝氏網路:認知與計算的理論結構〉於《科學的認知基礎》,Carruthers 等編輯,劍橋,2002年。
Gopnik, A., and C. Glymour. "Causal Maps and Bayes Nets: A Cognitive and Computational Account of Theory-Formation." In The Cognitive Basis of Science. Edited by Carruthers et al. Cambridge, 2002.

Tenenbaum, J. B., 與 S. Niyogi,《學習抽象的因果知識》
Tenenbaum, J. B., and S. Niyogi. Learning Abstract Causal Knowledge.

關於合理性與象徵推理的討論
DISCUSSION on Rationality & Symbolic Reasoning

Ahn, W-K., 與 L. M. Graham,〈充分與必要條件在Wason四卡選擇作業的衝擊〉,《心理科學》第10期(1999年)237-242頁。
Ahn, W-K., and L. M. Graham. "The Impact of Necessity and Sufficiency in the Wason Four-Card Selection Task." Psychological Science 10 (1999): 237-242.

Cheng, P. W., 與 K. J. Holyoak.,〈天擇之上的推理理論〉,《認知》第33期(1989年)285-313頁。
Cheng, P. W., and K. J. Holyoak. "On the Natural Selection of Reasoning Theories." Cognition 33 (1989): 285-313.

Cosmides, L., 與 J. Tooby,〈社會交換的認知適應〉,於《適應的心智》,J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby編輯,牛津:牛津大學出版社,1989年,163-228頁。
Cosmides, L., and J. Tooby. "Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange." In The Adapted Mind. Edited by J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 163-228.

Oaksford M., 與 N. Chater,,〈選擇作業的理性分析如同理想化的資料選擇〉,《心理學回顧》第101期(1994年)608-631頁。
Oaksford M., and N. Chater, "A Rational Analysis of the Selection Task As Optimal Data Selection." Psychological Review 101 (1994): 608-631.

可能性的推理
Probabilistic Reasoning

Chase, V. M., R. Hertwig, 與 G. Gigerenzer.,〈理性的視覺〉,《認知科學的趨勢》第2期(1998年)206-214頁。
Chase, V. M., R. Hertwig, and G. Gigerenzer. "Visions of Rationality." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (1998): 206-214.

Nisbett, R. E., D. H. Krantz, C. Jepson, 與 Z. Kunda.,〈統計捷思在日常推理中的運用〉,《心理學回顧》第90期(1983年)339-363頁。
Nisbett, R. E., D. H. Krantz, C. Jepson, and Z. Kunda. "The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning." Psychological Review 90 (1983): 339-363.

托夫斯基與卡尼曼,〈可能性的推理〉(1974/1983)。於《哲學與認知科學閱讀》,A. Goldman,編輯,麻省劍橋MIT出版社,1993年,45-68頁。
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. "Probabilistic Reasoning." (1974/1983). In Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Edited by A. Goldman, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, pp. 45-68.

決策
Decision Making

薛佛與托夫斯基,〈決策〉, 於《思考:認知科學的邀請》,E. E. Smith, and D. N. Osherson.編輯,第2卷,麻省劍橋MIT出版社,1995年,77-100頁。
Shafir, E., and A. Tversky. "Decision Making." In Thinking: An Invitation to Cognitive Science. Edited by E. E. Smith, and D. N. Osherson. Vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995, pp. 77-100.

Stephens, D. W., 與 J. R. Krebs.,〈危機感的搜索〉, 於《搜索理論》第六章,普林斯頓大學出版社,1986年。
Stephens, D. W., and J. R. Krebs. "Risk-Sensitive Foraging." Chap. 6 in Foraging Theory. Princeton University Press, 1986.

針對認知進展的討論
DISCUSSION on Frontiers of Cognition

Frank, R. H.,《推理中的熱情:情緒的策略性角色》,紐約牛頓出版社,1988年,1-14、19-35、43-63和185-211頁。
Frank, R. H. Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. New York: Norton, 1988, pp. 1-14, 19-35, 43-63, and 185-211.

葛林與海蒂,〈道德判斷如何(及在哪裡)作用?〉,《認知科學趨勢》第6卷12期(2002.12.1),517-523頁。
Greene, J., and J. Haidt. "How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?" Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6, 12 (1 Dec 2002): 517-523.

PubMed摘要︰道德的心理學長期關注在推理上,但最近的證據顯示,道德判斷更傾向於是一種情緒和感情直覺的情況,而非謹慎的推理。在此我們討論了心理學和認知神經科學的新近發現,包括了尤其是調查道德判斷的幾種研究。這些發現指出了感動的重要性,雖然它們允許推理可以扮演一種在道德判斷中受限制但意義重大的角色。它們指向一種道德判斷之功能性神經解剖學的初步說明,根據實驗,大腦的許多區域而非一塊特定區域,將對道德判斷產生重要影響。

PubMed abstract: Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.

米勒與泰德,〈從配對選擇到認知〉,《認知科學趨勢》第2卷,1998年,190-198頁。
Miller, G. F., and P. M. Todd. "Mate Choice Turns Cognitive." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (1998): 190-198.

席勒,〈如何科學地學習意識?〉,《大腦研究回顧》第26期(1998年)279-387頁。
Searle, J. "How to Study Consciousness Scientifically." Brain Research Reviews 26 (1998): 379-387.

PubMed摘要︰神經科學現今前進到一個位置,我們現在已可以將意識如同其他對象,視為一個科學問題。這個問題是,如何說明大腦程序引起意識,和意識如何在大腦中實現。這個過程被某些哲學錯誤所阻礙,此論文目的是移除這些錯誤中的九個:(i)意識無法被定義;(ii)意識是主觀的但科學是客觀的;(iii)大腦程序不能說明意識;(iv)「感質」的問題不應予以理會;(v)意識是副現象的;(vi)意識並無演化的功能;(vii)意識的因果說明必須是二元的;(viii)科學是還原論式的,所以意識的一個科學式說明將顯示,它可以被還原到某種其他事物上;以及(ix)意識的一個說明必須是一種資訊處理的說明。

PubMed abstract: The neurosciences have advanced to the point that we can now treat consciousness as a scientific problem like any other. The problem is to explain how brain processes cause consciousness and how consciousness is realized in the brain. Progress is impeded by a number of philosophical mistakes, and the aim of this paper is to remove nine of those mistakes: (i) consciousness cannot be defined; (ii) consciousness is subjective but science is objective; (iii) brain processes cannot explain consciousness; (iv) the problem of 'qualia' should be set aside; (v) consciousness is epiphenomenal; (vi) consciousness has no evolutionary function; (vii) a causal account of consciousness is necessarily dualistic; (viii) science is reductionistic, so a scientific account of consciousness would show it reducible to something else; and (ix) an account of consciousness must be an information processing account.

記憶系統 I
Memory Systems I

語言與思考
Language & Thought

Boroditsky, Lera.,〈語言相對論〉,於《認知科學百科》,2003年。
Boroditsky, Lera. "Linguistic Relativity." In Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. 2003.

包爾曼與丘,〈語言意義的塑造:普遍的與語言特定在空間語意類別的攫取〉,於《語言攫取和概念發展》,M. Bowerman, and S. Levinson.編輯,2001年,215-256頁。
Bowerman, M., and S. Choi. "Shaping Meanings for Language: Universal and Language-Specific in the Acquisition of Spatial Semantic Categories." In Language Acquisition and Conceptual Development. Edited by M. Bowerman, and S. Levinson. 2001, pp. 215-256.

普魯曼,〈愛斯基摩字彙的謎團〉,於 《愛斯基摩字彙的謎團與其他在語言研究上不敬的評論》,芝加哥大學出版社,1991年,159-171頁。
Pullum, Geoffrey K. "The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax." In The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax, and Other Irreverent Essays On The Study of Language. University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 159-171.

史洛賓,〈從「思考和語言」到「為說話而思考」〉,於《語言相對論的再思考》,J. J. Gumperz, and S. C. Levinson編輯,劍橋劍橋大學出版社出版,1996年。
Slobin, D. "From "thought and language'' to "thinking for speaking''." In Rethinking Linguistic Relativity. Edited by J. J. Gumperz, and S. C. Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.




 
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